

Identification of Network Effects with Spatially Endogenous Covariates: Theory, Simulations and an Empirical Application*

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Abstract

Researchers interested in the estimation of peer and network effects, even if these are algebraically identified, still need to address the problem of correlated effects. In this paper we characterize the identification conditions for consistently estimating all the parameters of a spatially autoregressive or linear-in-means model when the structure of social or peer effects is exogenous, but the observed and unobserved characteristics of agents are cross-correlated over some given metric space. We show that identification is possible if the network of social interactions is non-overlapping up to enough degrees of separation, and the spatial matrix that characterizes the co-dependence of individual unobservables and peers' characteristics is known up to a multiplicative constant. We propose a GMM approach for the estimation of the model's parameters, and we evaluate its performance through Monte Carlo simulations. Finally, we show that in a classical empirical application about classmates our approach might estimate statistically non-significant peer effects when conventional approaches register them as significant.

JEL Classification Codes: C21, C31, D85

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1 Introduction

A sizable body of empirical economic research concerns the analysis of peer effects, network effects and more generally “social effects,” i.e. mutual externalities induced by socio-economic interaction. Within this literature, peer effects in education occupy a prominent position (Sacerdote, 2001; Calvó-Armengol et al., 2009; De Giorgi et al., 2010; Carrell et al., 2013), but applications in more diverse fields are also numerous (Glaeser et al., 1996; Duflo and Saez, 2003; Mas and Moretti, 2009).¹ In the face of a growing empirical evidence, econometric analysis has struggled for a while to provide a unique structural interpretation to observed group correlations in socio-economic outcomes. Over time, advances have been made: to unambiguously identify the effect of social interactions, the current econometric theory and practice emphasize the use of instrumental variables based upon the observable characteristics of indirectly connected agents in structures of social interactions with a non-trivial topology, such as networks (Bramoullé et al., 2009). However, this kind of approach is largely confined to a restricted set of settings where such characteristics, as well as the structure of socio-economic interactions itself, are both as good as exogenous. This makes these studies liable to the critique, which was put forward most notably by Angrist (2014), according to which the current results in the literature are likely to reflect spurious correlations due to unobserved “correlated effects” that are shared between peers.

By contrast, in this paper we examine a cross-sectional model of social interactions where observed and unobserved individual characteristics are: *i.* both cross-correlated across individuals in some metric space, and *ii.* mutually dependent on one another. Our point of departure is a “Spatially Autoregressive” model (Cliff and Ord, 1981), hereinafter SAR, whose econometrics has been analyzed extensively (Lee, 2007a,b; Lee et al., 2010; Lin and Lee, 2010; Liu and Lee, 2010; Lee and Liu, 2010). Similarly to other papers, we derive our empirical model from an explicit theoretical (strategic) framework; unlike most, ours is based on a Cobb-Douglas utility function, and it can accommodate contexts ranging from peer effects in the classroom to R&D spillovers.

¹Studies of R&D and knowledge spillovers more generally, which follow the tradition initiated by Jaffe (1986, 1989), are seldom counted among these studies. This is quite a notable omission, since the workhorse econometric frameworks employed in this literature are easily seen as variations of the standard spatial models utilized for the estimation of peer effects. More recent contributions about R&D spillovers include Bloom et al. (2013), Lychagin et al. (2016) and Zacchia (2020). Other related strands of literature include the one about peer effects in scientific production (Azoulay et al., 2010; Waldinger, 2012) and that about learning externalities (Conley and Udry, 2010).

We explicitly illustrate that in such a framework, the type of endogenous dependence that we allow for not only makes standard estimates of social effects inconsistent, but can also be – under some specifications – observationally equivalent to the so-called “exogenous” or “contextual” effects of peers’ characteristics that are often featured in studies about social interactions. Both observations resonate with the aforementioned critique of the whole empirical literature about social effects.

The main contribution of our paper is to show that within this framework, social effects are identified without resorting to external instruments. We analyze a scenario where the observable characteristics of socio-economic agents depend in a linear fashion on both their own unobservables and on those of other agents, which makes such characteristics both endogenous and cross-correlated. We impose no restriction upon the spatial matrices that characterize this type of endogeneity, except that they are known to the econometrician up to a multiplicative parameter – which is also identified – that quantifies the extent of endogeneity. As we elaborate later, knowing the *structure* but not the *intensity* of spatial correlation is arguably realistic in many empirical settings. The main identifying assumption extends those by Bramoullé et al. (2009), as it requires that the structure of social interactions is non-overlapping up to an additional degree of separation in network space. The intuition is that the type of endogeneity featured in our framework introduces a bias that is observationally equivalent to higher-order network effects; the bias can be explicitly controlled for by accounting for the correlation between an individual’s outcome and the characteristics of higher-order indirect connections in the network. To do that, such correlations must be separately identified at different degrees of separation.

Leveraging upon the moment conditions on which our identification results are based, we propose a GMM approach for the joint estimation of both social effects and the other parameters of our framework. We derive the asymptotic properties of our estimator and we evaluate its performance in Monte Carlo simulations. Furthermore, we showcase it empirically by applying it to the setting and data from the study by De Giorgi et al. (2010), which is about peer effects in the classroom between students of Bocconi University in Italy. Although peer groups are formed exogenously in that setting, it is arguable that the observable characteristics of students – such as their high school grades – are cross-correlated in a predictable fashion, e.g. as a function of two students’ geographical provenance. Indeed, the estimates of peer effects obtained through an application of our method which accounts for cross-correlation structures

of this predictable kind are smaller in magnitude when compared to other customary approaches, and they are not statistically significant. We interpret these results as a warning against the incautious interpretation of cross-correlations in peer outcomes as the result of structural, behavioral mechanisms.

To better frame our contribution, it is worth to summarize the intellectual history of the workhorse framework in many studies on social effects: the “linear-in-means” model (a special case of an augmented SAR model). In a seminal paper, Manski (1993) highlighted the “reflection problem:” social effects occurring in segregated groups are hard to identify, because group characteristics and group outcomes are simultaneous. Since then, econometricians have striven to characterize conditions under which social effects can be disentangled from confounding factors. The aforementioned, influential contribution by Bramoullé et al. (2009) illustrates how to solve the reflection problem and identify social effects when the latter are shaped via networked structures of interaction; this can be especially appealing as networks typically provide more realistic descriptions of actual social relationships. Blume et al. (2015) incorporate their identification results – as well as one based upon covariance restrictions which builds on Graham (2008) – within a larger framework. Thanks to these and other efforts, it is now well understood that complex patterns of individual dependence make the identification of social effects, if anything, easier.

Yet all these analyses maintain the assumption that the model’s error term is conditionally independent of the individual covariates and the structure of interactions. Obviously, the spatial econometrics literature has examined correlated unobservables at length (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998, 2007, 2010; Kapoor et al., 2007; Drukker et al., 2013); however, individual covariates are typically assumed exogenous in such studies. In a recent survey of the literature about peer effects in networks, Bramoullé et al. (2020) discuss several randomization-based attempts aimed at addressing endogeneity in the composition of peer groups: a problem which is distinct, albeit related, to that of correlated effects. The survey cites an earlier, incomplete version of our paper as the only recent contribution attempting a structural approach to address the issue of correlated effects, a method potentially amenable to observational studies. Our idea of exploiting the very spatial structure of endogenous cross-correlation for the sake of identification builds upon some previous work by Zacchia (2020).²

²Zacchia (2020) analyzes a model of R&D spillovers in which firms’ unobservables are correlated in the network of R&D relationships, and are simultaneous to the R&D of connected firms. In order

As mentioned, several contributions have focused on the problem that the actual networked structure of interactions may itself be endogenous. Following a recommendation given by Blume et al. (2015), some scholars (Arduini et al., 2015; Johnsson and Moon, 2021) developed a control function approach to account for this issue. These methods embed, within a SAR-like framework, a network formation model based on Graham (2017).³ In other, more empirical contributions, the network or part of it is random (Sacerdote, 2001; De Giorgi et al., 2010; Carrell et al., 2013). We argue that randomizing the peer groups is not sufficient to solve the problem of correlated effects if spatial correlation in the unobservables is pervasive. To clearly keep the two issues as distinct, we maintain throughout that the network is exogenous. In future work, it would be worthwhile to integrate our estimator together with structural approaches, e.g. based on control functions, for addressing network endogeneity.

It is useful to relate our article to other papers from the literature about peer and network effects. In addition to the cited contribution by Graham (2008), other papers make use of conditional covariance restrictions to achieve the identification of social effects (Glaeser et al., 1996; Moffitt, 2001; Davezies et al., 2009; Pereda-Fernández, 2017; Rose, 2017a). Our method also exploits some covariance restrictions, but unlike these papers, their role in identification is to disentangle the autonomous covariance structure of the error term from that of individual covariates, if the two are correlated. Other contributions develop methods for estimating unknown structures of interaction (Rose, 2017b; De Paula et al., 2018) using penalized estimators. While we make no use of such techniques, we argue that they may be adapted for the sake of recovering the structure of spatial correlation that induces endogeneity. We revisit this observation in the conclusion of the paper while suggesting future lines of work.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our general analytical framework. Section 3 discusses the conditions for the identification of social effects. Section 4 introduces our GMM estimator as well as its asymptotic properties. Section 5 assesses its performance via Monte Carlo simulations. Section 6 describes the empirical application for our proposed estimator. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper. An Appendix provides mathematical proofs of our main results.

to identify spillover effects, he constructs IVs motivated on the finite empirical spatial correlation of R&D. The framework presented here instead does not restrict the spatial correlation of covariates.

³In a recent contribution, Kuersteiner and Prucha (2020) examine a SAR model for panel data in which the interaction matrix is possibly endogenous and covariates are weakly exogenous, and propose an appropriate GMM estimator. In our cross-sectional framework covariates are endogenous.

2 Analytical Framework

In this section we introduce the social interactions game that constitutes the theoretical framework of this paper. We subdivide this section between the description of the model's setup and the discussion of the equilibrium predictions.

2.1 Model's Setup

We consider an abstract setting of social and economic interactions between heterogeneous agents (players) in a network. In order to allow for interdependence between the characteristics of agents and the structure of their connections, we allow nature to randomly draw the *weighted network* $(\mathcal{I}, \mathcal{G})$ that characterizes the social interactions. Here, \mathcal{I} is the set that comprises the N players, who are indexed as $i = 1, \dots, N$. The N^2 -dimensional set \mathcal{G} , instead, represents the interaction structure: thus, $g_{ij} \in \mathbb{R}$ denotes the relative strength of the influence exerted by player j on player i (and vice versa). We impose two standard normalizations: $g_{ij} \in [0, 1]$ and $g_{ii} = 0$ for all players $i = 1, \dots, N$. Otherwise, we force no particular structure of the network: we generally allow for asymmetric, directed networks such that for any pair $(i, j) \in \mathcal{I}^2$, the weight g_{ij} implies no restriction upon the weight g_{ji} , and vice versa.

Every player in \mathcal{I} is typified by two variables (x_i, ε_i) . We denominate $x_i \in \mathcal{X}$ the *observable characteristics* of player i , and $\varepsilon_i \in \mathcal{E}$ his or her *unobservables*: this abstract terminology clearly relates to the information which is available to the econometricians who are in search of social externalities. For simplicity we set $\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{E} = \mathbb{R}$, although many, possibly discrete characteristics could easily be accommodated. We assume that the random vector of individual observable characteristics $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_N)$, the random vector of individual unobservables, $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon} = (\varepsilon_1, \dots, \varepsilon_N)$ and the network \mathcal{G} are all randomly drawn from a joint probability distribution $\mathcal{F}(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}, \mathcal{G})$, which is known by all agents. We place no a priori restrictions on the distribution $\mathcal{F}(\cdot)$.

The economic content of the description outlined thus far deserves some further discussion. In social networks, the probability of a connection occurring between any two agents is documented to be correlated with their characteristics. For example, friends usually sort on social background and demographics, while R&D spillovers naturally occur between firms belonging to the same technological class. This result is predicted by many models of random and strategic network formation, and the social mechanism by which similar agents are paired to one another bears the name

of homophily. However, it is apparent that many of the characteristics that predict the occurrence (or the relative strength) of connections are unobserved by researchers: for example, student friendships may be sorted on ability; likewise, R&D connections may appear more frequently between firms with shared technologies. In either case, the fact that connected agents share some of their unobservables poses identification problems to econometricians interested in social effects.

Players maximize the following “twice exponential” utility function:

$$U_i(e_1, \dots, e_N; x_i, \varepsilon_i) = \exp[y_i(e_1, \dots, e_N; x_i, \varepsilon_i)] - \exp(e_i), \quad (1)$$

where y_i is the individual-level *outcome* (denoting, say, grades, or production output) which is determined through the following linear relationship:

$$y_i(e_1, \dots, e_N; x_i, \varepsilon_i) = \alpha_0 + \gamma_0 x_i + \mu e_i + \nu \sum_{j=1}^N g_{ij} e_j + \varepsilon_i. \quad (2)$$

The outcomes of individuals depend upon their characteristics (x_i, ε_i) as well as on a costly strategic variable $e_i \in \mathbb{R}$ that we call *effort*: this may represent, for instance, time dedicated to homework or R&D investment. Because of social interactions and externalities, y_i also depends on the effort of all the other players an agent is connected to (possibly negatively). Private and social effects of effort are parametrized as μ and ν , respectively. To make the model realistic, we impose the following restriction.

Assumption 1. Concavity: $\mu \in (0, 1)$.

This assumption makes *i.* individual output positively dependent on effort, and *ii.* the utility function concave in $\exp(e_i)$, so that choice trade-offs are cogent. As we discuss later, additional restrictions on ν are necessary to ensure equilibrium uniqueness.

Note two differences between this framework and the quadratic utility model that is typical of the peer effects literature (Calvó-Armengol et al., 2009; Blume et al., 2015). First, the model proposed here outlines a clear distinction between individual choice variables and ultimate outcomes, which undoubtedly gives it more generality. Second, while both utility functions are globally concave in their respective strategic variables, in the case of (1) individual characteristics x_i , ability ε_i , individual effort e_i and the effort e_j of connections are complements. In addition to accommodating functional forms such as those that are typical of production functions, this increases

the degree of realism of the model even in other social contexts. For example, more skilled or better supported students may benefit relatively more from devoting more time to homework and independent study, either alone or with their friends. Finally, observe that one could easily introduce heterogeneous weights to the benefit and cost components of (1), but this is beyond the point of the present analysis.

We analyze a game of complete information characterized by the following timing.

1. Nature draws $(\mathbf{x}, \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}, \mathcal{G})$ from $\mathcal{F}(\cdot)$. Every player observes the result of this draw.
2. Players simultaneously make their effort choices, and utilities are realized.

By letting the network be generated randomly by nature we abstract from the specifics of the network formation process, as our results do not depend on it. Also note that by assuming complete information we make our analysis more general.⁴

2.2 Analysis

We analyze the properties of the equilibrium conditional upon a restriction, that we maintain throughout our discussion, about the combined parameter $\beta \equiv \nu(1 - \mu)^{-1}$.

Assumption 2. Non-explosiveness: $|\beta| \cdot \max_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \sum_{j=1}^N g_{ij} \in [0, 1)$.

This assumption imposes that social effects do not “dominate” the process of outcome generation. In the game, it ensures uniqueness of the equilibrium by ruling out unrealistically “explosive” scenarios. In statistical terms, this assumption makes it possible that the variation of y_i is not predominantly explained by the cross-correlation of outcomes in the network: we find that otherwise, the identification problems discussed in this article are largely moot, since standard estimators would capture the social effects with little bias relatively to the overall variance of the dependent variable. We observe that variations of this hypothesis are often assumed in the literature.

In standard models of peer effects, it is also routinely assumed that the in-degree of agents is constant and normalized to one, as follows.

Assumption 3. Row Normalization: $\bar{g}_i \equiv \sum_{j=1}^N g_{ij} = 1$ for all $i = 1, \dots, N$.

Under Assumption 3 social effects represent the individual response to the (weighted) average behavior or characteristics of peers. This contrasts with models where social

⁴As discussed by Zacchia (2020), incomplete information provides more avenues for the identification of social effects, through implicit restrictions on the cross-correlation of strategic variables.

effects are a function of the total intensity of connections. Throughout most of this paper we will maintain Assumption 3, while concentrating on the identification of the combined parameter β . Later we relax this hypothesis and, among the possible extensions of our approach, we discuss the possibility to separately identify μ and ν by exploiting variation in individual in-degree. Incidentally, observe that Assumption 3 implies that no agent is allowed to be “isolated” (disconnected from the network) and that under row normalization, Assumption 2 reduces to $|\beta| \in [0, 1)$.

Under all the hypotheses outlined thus far, the following result is easily obtained.

Proposition 1. Equilibrium. *For all realizations of $(\mathbf{x}, \varepsilon, \mathcal{G})$, under Assumptions 1-3 there exists a unique equilibrium of the game, which gives rise to an equation for the outcome y_i that can be expressed for each player $i = 1, \dots, N$ as follows:*

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta \sum_{j=1}^N g_{ij} y_j + \gamma x_i + \varepsilon_i, \quad (3)$$

where $\alpha \equiv (1 - \mu)^{-1} [\alpha_0 + (\mu + \nu) \log \mu]$ and $\gamma \equiv (1 - \mu)^{-1} \gamma_0$.

Proof. The First Order Condition from utility maximization can be written, for each player $j = 1, \dots, N$, as:

$$e_j = y_j + \log \mu. \quad (4)$$

Substituting this expression into (2) results in (3). Moreover, by substituting (2) into (4) and solving for e_j it is easily seen that – under the non-explosiveness condition – the N First Order Conditions together represent a contraction of (e_1, \dots, e_N) in the $(\mathbb{R}^N, \mathfrak{M})$ metric space, where \mathfrak{M} is the max norm. This implies uniqueness. \square

Let us examine the reduced form expression (3) that is generated in equilibrium. While it resembles the typical equation of a “linear-in-means” models from the peer effects literature, it provides some additional insights in relationship with the model. First, parameter β – corresponding to the *endogenous effect* from the original classification by Manski (1993) – is given here a clear behavioral interpretation. In fact, β is equal to the direct effect of connections’ effort ν amplified by a factor representing the equilibrium response of individual effort caused by complementarities: intuitively, students put additional effort while firms increase their R&D investment as they are aware of the interdependencies and expect their connections to behave similarly. This

interpretation of β is important, since in many empirical studies of social externalities individual “effort” is not observable by researchers.

The second difference with typical linear-in-means models is that in our model we do not include Manski’s *exogenous effect*, that is a structural dependence of individual outcomes on the characteristics x_j of peers (also called “contextual” effects). Although we could easily include an additional term in (2) to allow for the exogenous effect, we believe that our choice makes it easier to illustrate the following fact.

Proposition 2. Non-identification of contextual effects: *There exist specific restrictions on $\mathcal{F}(\cdot)$ such that the model is observationally equivalent to the following alternative structure:*

$$y_i = \alpha' + \beta' \sum_{j=1}^N g_{ij} y_j + \gamma' x_i + \delta' \sum_{j=1}^N g_{ij} x_j + \varepsilon'_i, \quad (5)$$

where $\delta' \neq 0$ and the random vector $\varepsilon' = (\varepsilon'_1, \dots, \varepsilon'_N)$ is such that $\mathbb{E}[\varepsilon' | \mathbf{x}, \mathcal{G}] = 0$.

Proof. Let $\mathcal{F}(\cdot)$ be such that $\varepsilon_i = \rho \sum_{j=1}^N g_{ij} \varepsilon_j + \varepsilon'_i$ and $\mathbb{E}[\varepsilon_j | x_j, \mathcal{G}] = \kappa + \chi x_j$, where it is $\chi \neq 0$ and $\rho \neq 0$. It is easy to see that under these conditions, models (3) and (5) are observationally equivalent under $\alpha' = \alpha + \rho\kappa$, $\beta' = \beta$, $\gamma' = \gamma$ and $\delta' = \rho\chi$. \square

While the particular example that we chose to straightforwardly prove our statement is abstract,⁵ it serves to make an important point. If individual unobservables ε_i are correlated in the network – say, because agents form connections by sorting on ability – and, in addition, individual characteristics x_i are also correlated with the unobservables, then “contextual effects” δ' are just a statistical byproduct of these more fundamental structural behavioral patterns. We see this as a cautionary message to researchers aiming to estimate spillover effects in any given economic context: the solution of potential endogeneity problems due to simultaneous unobservables and network formation must precede model specification. Clearly, a similar problem may also affect the main behavioral parameter β of endogenous spillover effects. The rest of this article discusses strategies aimed at disentangling genuine externalities from shared confounders. Throughout most of the exposition we maintain the assumption that individual “effort” is not directly observable by researchers.

⁵In that example ability ε_i follows a first order “spatially autoregressive” process, which implies that individual unobservables are increasingly dissimilar the farther apart are any two agents in the network (intuitively, a spatial AR(1) process can be approximated as a spatial MA(∞) process).

3 Identification

In this section we discuss under what conditions it is possible to identify the parameters of model (3) even if individual characteristics and the network are endogenous with respect to the unobservables. Following a description of the problem, we illustrate our approach first under simple linear assumptions about the underlying data generation process, and then under more general conditions. At the end of the section we comment on some possible extensions of the proposed methodology.

3.1 SAR models

We find it useful to briefly discuss how the endogeneity problem we examine compares with those of previous analyses. To this end, we re-write the statistical model implied by the structural relationship (3) by using compact notation:

$$\mathbf{y} = \boldsymbol{\alpha} + \boldsymbol{\beta}\mathbf{G}\mathbf{y} + \boldsymbol{\gamma}\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}. \quad (6)$$

For illustrative purposes, we omit for now the subindices denoting the sample size N . In (6), $\mathbf{y} = (y_1, \dots, y_N)^\top$, $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_N)^\top$ and $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon} = (\varepsilon_1, \dots, \varepsilon_N)^\top$ are the realizations of y_i , x_i and ε_i – respectively – stacked over all the agents; \mathbf{G} instead is the *adjacency matrix* with g_{ij} entries. Following the classification of spatial econometric models by Elhorst (2014), we call this a *spatially autoregressive* (SAR) model.⁶ Note that under row-normalization of \mathbf{G} (Assumption 3) any SAR model corresponds to the linear-in-means model typical of peer effects studies, but deprived of contextual effects.

The most apparent econometric problem of model 6 is one of simultaneity: since the y_i 's of different agents are structurally dependent on one another, the spatially autoregressive component $\mathbf{G}\mathbf{y}$ of (6) is correlated with the error term: hence, OLS estimation of (6) is inconsistent. The reflection problem discussed by Manski (1993) is a particular case of this issue, which applies when \mathbf{G} describes segregated groups like classrooms. There is a large literature in spatial econometrics, which is not our objective to review here, that concerns maximum likelihood estimation of (6) under normality assumptions. Semi-parametric approaches to the estimation of models akin to (6) include IV-2SLS (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998) and GMM (Lin and Lee, 2010).


⁶Other authors prefer the denomination “mixed regressive-spatially autoregressive” in order to remark the presence of \mathbf{x} on the right-hand side of (6). Here we opt for a more concise terminology.

The former is especially relevant here, as it has been extended to models featuring contextual effects and network fixed effects by Bramoullé et al. (2009).

To understand why internal identification of (6) is possible, observe that if \mathbf{G} is linearly independent from the identity matrix \mathbf{I} , as $(\mathbf{I} - \beta\mathbf{G})$ would also be invertible, the model can be then rewritten in a “reduced form” fashion as:

$$\mathbf{y} = (\mathbf{I} - \beta\mathbf{G})^{-1} (\alpha\mathbf{1} + \gamma\mathbf{x} + \varepsilon) \simeq \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s \mathbf{G}^s (\alpha\mathbf{1} + \gamma\mathbf{x} + \varepsilon) \quad (7)$$

implying, if $\mathbb{E}[\varepsilon|\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{G}] = 0$, the existence of an *infinite* set of instrumental variables of the form $(\mathbf{G}\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{G}^2\mathbf{x}, \dots)$. The intuition behind identification is that it is possible to predict the outcomes $\mathbf{G}\mathbf{y}$ of connected agents through their characteristics $\mathbf{G}\mathbf{x}$. This idea is exemplified in Graph 1, which represents variables $(x_i, y_i; x_j, y_j)$ of two connected observations (i, j) . In the graph, arrows represent the structural relationships between variables that allow to identify the indicated parameter of interest.



Graph 1: Identification of SAR models

Notes. In this graph, nodes represent variables specific to an observation, and arrows symbolize structural relationships embodied in model (6). Parameters are juxtaposed to arrows (structural relationships) if the latter identify the former.

Models featuring contextual effects like a term $\delta\mathbf{G}\mathbf{x}$ on the right-hand side of (6) entail the additional complication that clearly $\mathbf{G}\mathbf{x}$ is not excluded from the structural form. However, $\mathbf{G}^2\mathbf{x}$ would then be a relevant instrument for the identification of β : if contextual effects exist, the characteristics of “friends of friends” affect the outcomes of direct peers – easily extending the intuition above – so that β and δ are separately identified. These ideas are best framed as a system of simultaneous equations, which are generally known to be identified so long as enough instrument exist to satisfy both the order and rank conditions. Here it is the structure of networks that naturally gives rise to the appropriate exclusion restrictions, in the form of the characteristic of others agents that have no direct effect on individual outcomes (Rose, 2017b).

These ideas and the related results are all based on the assumptions of exogenous covariates \mathbf{x} . In the systematic analysis of the literature by Blume et al. (2015), an equivalent of assumption $\mathbb{E}[\boldsymbol{\varepsilon} | \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{G}] = 0$ is central to all results about identification. In SAR and linear-in-means models, the endogeneity of individual characteristics not only prevents the identification of their specific effect on the outcome of interest, but also of social effects themselves, as the x_i 's of peers can no longer serve as instruments for the spatially autoregressive term. This suggests that the extent of the problem depends on the breadth of endogeneity in network space – that is, to what extent individual unobservables are correlated with the characteristics of peers, of peers of peers and so forth. In what follows we illustrate under what conditions the internal identification of SAR models is possible even if the x_i 's are endogenous. For the sake of exposition, we start from a simplified, semi-formal characterization the problem. In the more general treatment we will introduce our assumptions more rigorously.

3.2 Spatial Linear Endogeneity


Suppose that the agents' characteristics \mathbf{x} are statistically related to the unobservables $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}$ according to the following simple linear relationship, for $i = 1, \dots, N$:

$$x_i = \tilde{x}_i + \xi \sum_{j=1}^N c_{ij} \varepsilon_j. \quad (8)$$

In the above, $\xi \in \mathbb{R}$ is a parameter; \tilde{x}_i is a random variable that we call the *independent component* of the variation of x_i , whose distribution is left unrestricted except for being assumed continuous ($\tilde{x}_i \neq \tilde{x}_j$ almost surely for $i \neq j$) as well as independent of individual unobservables ($\mathbb{E}[\tilde{x}_i \varepsilon_j] = 0$ for any i, j); whereas the weights c_{ij} , that we call *characteristic weights*, introduce the statistical spatial dependence of interest. Like in the case of the adjacency weights g_{ij} , we impose the normalization $c_{ij} \in [0, 1]$; unlike those, however, typically it is $c_{ii} \neq 0$. We collect all the characteristic weights in the N^2 -dimensional set \mathcal{C} , that we call the “characteristics structure.”

The relationship expressed in (8) can flexibly represent various patterns of interdependence between the socio-economic variables of different agents. In a schooling context, for example, the quality of teachers and the overall resources made available to a pupil (x_i) may endogenously depend on their preferences and/or abilities (ε_i) of their classmates. This may be induced via an explicit school-level allocation mecha-

nism, if say more motivated students are assigned the best resources or, conversely, more disadvantaged ones are compensated with some extra support. In this case, \mathcal{C} has a “fully segregated” group structure derived from that of classrooms.⁷ We place no restriction upon the statistical or the topological relationship between \mathcal{C} and \mathcal{G} : the network of interactions can both transcend, and statistically depend upon, the groups defined by \mathcal{C} . This is exemplified in Graph 2, which is thought to represent a typical schooling environment: friendships between groups (classrooms) are possible, but they are less likely to occur as they are within groups.



Graph 2: A Cross-Group Friendship Network

Notes. In this graph, nodes (e.g. i, j, k, ℓ) represents observations, edges denote social interactions (e.g. “friendships”) embodied in \mathcal{G} , whereas groups of observations bound within dash-dotted squares depict a fully segregated characteristics structure \mathcal{C} . Thus, it is for example $g_{i\ell} \neq 0$ but $c_{i\ell} = 0$, and at the same time, $g_{ik} = 0$ but $c_{ik} \neq 0$.

We do not restrict \mathcal{C} to fully segregated group structures. In fact, we allow it to represent any metric space defined over the set of observations \mathcal{I} ; possibly, it is $c_{ij} \neq 0$ for any pair (i, j) . In particular, in our empirical application we examine structures \mathcal{C} that are consistent with the spatial correlation across the observable characteristics of any two observations i and j exhibiting, for a given constant $D > 0$, *distance decay*:

$$\text{Cov}(x_i, x_j) \propto \exp(-D \cdot d_{ij}), \quad (9)$$

where d_{ij} is the geographical distance between the districts where students hail from. Observe that as per (8), $\text{Cov}(x_i, x_j) \neq 0$ if at least one of the following conditions is true: *i.* $\text{Cov}(\tilde{x}_i, \tilde{x}_j) \neq 0$; *ii.* $\xi \neq 0$ and $c_{ij} \neq 0$; *iii.* $\xi \neq 0$ and $\text{Cov}(\varepsilon_i, \varepsilon_j) \neq 0$. Hence, a

⁷By “fully segregated” group structure, we refer to a topological relationship between any triad of observations $(i, j, k) \in \mathcal{I}^3$ such that if i and j are connected, they are also either both connected or both disconnected to any third agent k (if $c_{ij} \neq 0$ then $c_{ik} \neq 0 \Leftrightarrow c_{jk} \neq 0$).

cross-correlation structure such as (9) may arise through a variety of mechanisms; for example, if x_i is some measure of a student's high-school background while in college (like in our empirical application) student self-selection occurring differentially across districts is consistent with the third condition listed above.

The setting we have described is a simple form of endogeneity that would threaten the identification of social effects in the spirit of Angrist's (2014) mentioned critique. In fact, it invalidates standard moments in the spirit of Lee (2007a) that are based on the spatial lags of \mathbf{x} . To verify this, collect the terms \tilde{x}_i and c_{ij} from (8) in the vector $\tilde{\mathbf{x}} = (\tilde{x}_1, \dots, \tilde{x}_N)^T$ and the *characteristics matrix* \mathbf{C} (of size $N \times N$) respectively, and assume that the error term $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}$ is mean independent of the network \mathbf{G} , the characteristics matrix \mathbf{C} , and the independent component of the variation of \mathbf{x} :

$$\mathbb{E}[\boldsymbol{\varepsilon} | \mathbf{G}, \mathbf{C}, \tilde{\mathbf{x}}] = \mathbf{0}. \quad (10)$$

This assumption helps illustrate how the bias introduced via our specification in (8) is distinct from the issue of network endogeneity (or, more generally, from the possibly endogenous determination of the characteristics structure). Assume, in addition, that the error term is conditionally homoscedastic, as follows:

$$\mathbb{E}[\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^T | \mathbf{G}, \mathbf{C}, \tilde{\mathbf{x}}] = \sigma_0^2 \mathbf{I}. \quad (11)$$

By iterating expectations, for any nonnegative integer q we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}[(\mathbf{G}^q \mathbf{x})^T \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}] &= \mathbb{E}[(\tilde{\mathbf{x}} + \xi \mathbf{C} \boldsymbol{\varepsilon})^T (\mathbf{G}^q)^T \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}] \\ &= \xi \cdot \mathbb{E}[\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^T (\mathbf{G}^q \mathbf{C})^T \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}] \\ &= \xi \cdot \text{Tr}(\mathbf{C} \mathbf{G}^q \cdot \mathbb{E}[\boldsymbol{\varepsilon} \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^T]) \\ &= \xi \sigma_0^2 \cdot \text{vec}(\mathbf{C})^T \text{vec}(\mathbf{G}^q), \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

where the second line exploits the fact that $\mathbb{E}[(\mathbf{G}^q \tilde{\mathbf{x}})^T \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}] = 0$ under (10), while the subsequent lines exploit (11) and the properties of the related trace and vectorization operators. This result highlights why moments *à la* Bramoullé et al. (2009) have a non-zero expectation in this setting:⁸ if the characteristics structure and the network

⁸In the Appendix we discuss a more detailed analysis, which allows for a more general structure of the error term, of the bias entailed by conventional methods under our assumptions.

topology overlap to some extent ($\text{vec}(\mathbf{C})^T \text{vec}(\mathbf{G}^q) \neq 0$), the individual unobservables are correlated with the characteristics of the “peers-of-peers.” Note that we derived an explicit expression for the bias: this naturally suggests a set of moment conditions for the identification of the combined parameters $\boldsymbol{\vartheta} \equiv (\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \xi^*)$, where $\xi^* \equiv \xi\sigma_0$:

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\begin{pmatrix} \iota^T \\ \mathbf{x}^T \\ \mathbf{x}^T \mathbf{G} \\ \mathbf{x}^T \mathbf{G}^2 \end{pmatrix} (\mathbf{y} - \alpha \iota - \beta \mathbf{G} \mathbf{y} - \gamma \mathbf{x}) \right] - \xi^* \cdot \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ \text{Tr}(\mathbf{C}) \\ \text{Tr}(\mathbf{C}\mathbf{G}) \\ \text{Tr}(\mathbf{C}\mathbf{G}^2) \end{bmatrix} = \mathbf{0}. \quad (13)$$

In fact, the identification of $\boldsymbol{\vartheta}$ is possible under very general conditions.

Proposition 3. Identification under spatial linear endogeneity. *Consider the statistical model characterized by equations (6), (8), (11) and (10); and suppose that matrices \mathbf{C} and \mathbf{G} are observed. If the three matrices \mathbf{I} , \mathbf{G} and \mathbf{G}^2 are linearly independent and matrix \mathbf{C} overlaps at least partially with any of the three matrices above – in the sense that the traces $\text{Tr}(\mathbf{C})$, $\text{Tr}(\mathbf{C}\mathbf{G})$ and $\text{Tr}(\mathbf{C}\mathbf{G}^2)$ are not simultaneously all zeros – then the combined parameters $\boldsymbol{\vartheta} \equiv (\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \xi^*)$ are almost surely identified.*

Proof. The Jacobian matrix $\mathbf{H}(\boldsymbol{\vartheta})$ of the moment conditions (13) can be split as follows. The first row is trivially given by:


$$\mathbf{H}_{1,*}(\boldsymbol{\vartheta}) = -\mathbb{E} \left[N \begin{bmatrix} \iota^T \mathbf{G} \mathbf{y} & \iota^T \mathbf{x} & 0 \end{bmatrix} \right],$$

while the block constituted by the second, third and fourth rows can be written as:

$$\mathbf{H}_{2-4,*}(\boldsymbol{\vartheta}) = - \begin{bmatrix} \text{vec}(\mathbf{I})^T \\ \text{vec}(\mathbf{G})^T \\ \text{vec}(\mathbf{G}^2)^T \end{bmatrix} \cdot \mathbb{E} \left[\text{vec}(\iota \mathbf{x}^T) \quad \text{vec}(\mathbf{G} \mathbf{y} \mathbf{x}^T) \quad \text{vec}(\mathbf{x} \mathbf{x}^T) \quad \text{vec}(\mathbf{C}) \right],$$

by exploiting again the properties of the trace and vectorization operators. Observe that, by the specification of linear endogeneity (8), $\text{vec}(\iota \mathbf{x}^T)$, $\text{vec}(\mathbf{x} \mathbf{x}^T)$ and $\text{vec}(\mathbf{C})$ are almost surely linearly independent, even if \mathbf{C} has constant columns. Furthermore, by the definition of a SAR model (6), these vectors would be almost surely linearly independent of $\text{vec}(\mathbf{G} \mathbf{y} \mathbf{x}^T)$ as well. In this case, matrix $\mathbf{H}(\boldsymbol{\vartheta})$ is singular under only two circumstances: either matrices \mathbf{I} , \mathbf{G} and \mathbf{G}^2 – and thus their vectorized versions – are linearly dependent; or the traces of matrices \mathbf{C} , $\mathbf{C}\mathbf{G}$ and $\mathbf{C}\mathbf{G}^2$ are all zero. \square

This is a very powerful result: it states that if the researcher has some knowledge about the spatial extent of the process which relates the observable characteristics of agents to the unobservables of some others, then the parameters of the SAR model – including the “endogenous” social effect β – can be identified under the same conditions given by Bramoullé et al. (2009): that the network \mathcal{G} is not shaped according to a “fully overlapping” group structure. In addition, it is necessary that the characteristics matrix \mathbf{C} – which defines the spatial extent of endogeneity – overlaps at least partially with the network, but otherwise it is left unrestricted; it is allowed to assume a group structure or to coincide with the adjacency matrix \mathbf{G} . This second condition, however, is largely moot, since its violation would prevent the identification of the combined parameter ξ^* , but not of the main parameters of interest (α, β, γ) . In fact, if the spatial correlation of individual characteristics is unrelated to the network there is no endogeneity problem, and standard “peers-of-peers” instruments are valid! This point also illustrates why estimates from empirical studies where \mathbf{G} is randomized might still be inconsistent. In fact, if \mathbf{C} is “pervasive,” i.e. for most pairs $(i, j) \in \mathcal{I}^2$ it is $c_{ij} \neq 0$, it is likely that $\text{vec}(\mathbf{C})^T \text{vec}(\mathbf{G}^q) \neq 0$ even with a random network.



Graph 3: Identification of SAR models under spatial linear endogeneity

Notes. In this graph, nodes represent variables specific to an observation, and arrows symbolize structural relationships embodied in model (6). Parameters are juxtaposed to arrows (structural relationships) if the latter identify the former. Subscripts denote specific nodes-observations that are depicted in Graph 2.

We illustrate the intuition behind our identification result in two ways: one graphical and one algebraic-statistical. The graphical one is supported by Graph 3, which represents the structural relationships between the x and y variables of four observations (i, j, k, ℓ) that are involved in both the network and the group structure depicted in Graph 2. Consider first observations i, j and k , who all belong to Group A. While i and j are directly connected, identification of β and γ cannot proceed like in an “exogenous” SAR (Graph 1) since both own characteristics x_i and the characteristics x_j of a connected group mate are contaminated by the unobservables. However, the

characteristics x_k of agent k , who is connected to j but not to i , still correlate to the outcome y_i ; hence, *conditioning on the endogenous effect* they reflect the endogeneity due to the group structure as per (8), allowing identification of ξ^* . Hence, β and γ can be identified residually like in the exogenous case. Consider next agent ℓ , who is a direct friend of i but belongs to a different group: his or her characteristics x_ℓ do not correlate with i 's unobservables under the running assumptions, and thus can be exploited in order to straightforwardly identify the social effect β . While useful, this is redundant for identification, since it is enough that agent i has *at least one* indirect friend, even if from the same group like k .

Moving to the second piece of intuition, consider again the reduced form of the SAR model given in (7); under the endogeneity specification (8) it reads:

$$\mathbf{y} = (\mathbf{I} - \beta \mathbf{G})^{-1} [\alpha \mathbf{1} + \gamma (\tilde{\mathbf{x}} + \xi \mathbf{C} \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}) + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}] \simeq \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s \mathbf{G}^s [\alpha \mathbf{1} + \gamma \tilde{\mathbf{x}} + (\mathbf{I} + \gamma \xi \mathbf{C}) \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}]. \quad (14)$$

The model would be identified similarly to the “exogenous” case if researchers could observe the independent component \tilde{x}_i of the observable characteristics x_i , which is unfeasible.⁹ However, if a researcher knows \mathbf{C} , these independent components can be indirectly backed up through the following, intuitively appealing nonlinear moments:

$$\mathbb{E} \left[(\mathbf{x} - \xi \mathbf{C} \boldsymbol{\varepsilon})^T \mathbf{G}^q \boldsymbol{\varepsilon} \right] = 0, \quad (15)$$

for $q = 0, 1, 2$ or higher. Note that like in Proposition 3, ξ^* is identified if \mathbf{C} overlaps at least partially with matrices \mathbf{I} , \mathbf{G} , and \mathbf{G}^2 , and such overlap presents some variation (which does under the standard linear independence condition).¹⁰

3.3 Spatial Linear Endogeneity: General Result

The identification result illustrated by Proposition 3 is restricted to a simple model under very restrictive structure of the error terms and assumptions. We thus turn to

⁹Control function approaches could provide an avenue for estimating (14). Intuitively, suitable spatial functions of the other observations' residuals can be used in order to purge the endogenous component of \mathbf{x} from the right-hand side. While we leave a proper of analysis of control functions in this setting to future work, we find this observation useful for building intuition about our approach.

¹⁰We simulated an estimation of our model using moment conditions (15); however, this exercise is outperformed by the main simulation which is based on the bias-adjusted moments (13), that we discuss in Section 5. Both sets of moments follow from the same data generation process and thus should be equivalent, but the linear ones are computationally more convenient.

the discussion of the following, more general model:

$$\mathbf{y} = \alpha\mathbf{1} + \beta\mathbf{G}\mathbf{y} + \mathbf{X}\boldsymbol{\gamma} + \mathbf{G}\mathbf{X}\boldsymbol{\delta} + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}, \quad (16)$$

where \mathbf{X} is a $N \times K$ data matrix of K observable characteristics (with $\mathbf{X}^T\mathbf{X}$ having full rank), $\boldsymbol{\gamma} = (\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_K)$ is the vector of K direct effects associated with each of these characteristics, and $\boldsymbol{\delta} = (\delta_1, \dots, \delta_K)$ are the K related “contextual effects.” In Elhorst’s taxonomy, this is a standard multivariate “Spatial Durbin Model” (SDM), otherwise known – under row-normalization of \mathbf{G} – as a linear-in-means model. Note that such a model could easily follow from an extension of our theoretical framework, where nature initially draws $(\mathbf{X}, \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}, \mathcal{G})$ from some more general distribution $\mathcal{F}(\cdot)$. To keep the problem interesting we presume that all the observable characteristics \mathbf{X} are potentially endogenous and structurally dependent on $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}$, or else a single exogenous factor could be enough to identify β under the logic of Graph 1. In addition, we allow for a more general structure of the error term as per the following assumptions.

Assumption 4. Primitive shocks: *there exists a set of N “primitive” i.i.d. shocks $\mathbf{v} \equiv (v_1, \dots, v_N)^T$ such that $\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{v}] = \mathbf{0}$ and, for some $d > 0$, $\mathbb{E}[|v_i|^{4+d}] < \infty$ for $i = 1, \dots, N$.*

Assumption 5. SARMA Unobservables: *the unobservable characteristics follow a stationary Spatial Autoregressive Moving Average process of order (A, M) :*

$$\boldsymbol{\varepsilon} = (\mathbf{I} - \phi_1\mathbf{F}_1 - \phi_2\mathbf{F}_2 - \dots - \phi_A\mathbf{F}_A)^{-1} (\mathbf{I} + \psi_1\mathbf{E}_1 + \psi_2\mathbf{E}_2 + \dots + \psi_M\mathbf{E}_M) \mathbf{v},$$

where $(\mathbf{E}_1, \mathbf{E}_2, \dots, \mathbf{E}_M)$ and $(\mathbf{F}_1, \mathbf{F}_2, \dots, \mathbf{F}_M)$ are two possibly identical sets of linearly independent $N \times N$ matrices; $\Phi_a \equiv \mathbf{I} - \sum_{a=1}^a \phi_a \mathbf{F}_a$ is invertible for all $a' \leq A$, and the associated parameters are restricted to the unit circle: $\|\boldsymbol{\phi}\|_2 < 1$ and $\|\boldsymbol{\psi}\|_2 < 1$.

Together, these two assumptions characterize the stochastic properties of the error term, which is allowed to have a very general spatial correlation structure expressed in terms of a sequence of “primitive” well-behaved shocks. The spatially autoregressive component of the error term is defined by the sequence of matrices $(\mathbf{F}_1, \dots, \mathbf{F}_A)$ as well as the set of parameters $\boldsymbol{\phi} = (\phi_1, \dots, \phi_A)$; the moving average part is encapsulated by matrices $(\mathbf{E}_1, \dots, \mathbf{E}_M)$ and parameters $\boldsymbol{\psi} = (\psi_1, \dots, \psi_M)$. Note that both sequences of matrices can be identical and depend on the network structure; a leading case that we allow is $\mathbf{F}_a = \mathbf{G}^a$ for $a \leq A$ and $\mathbf{F}_m = \mathbf{G}^m$ for $m \leq M$. While

this specification is quite flexible, we are especially interested in the Spatial Moving Average (SMA) component of the process. If the spatially autocorrelated component is absent (e.g. $\boldsymbol{\phi} = \mathbf{0}$), in fact, a spatial moving average process implies finite spatial autocorrelation in the space under analysis. We find this empirical property to be a good approximation of some real-world stylized facts about variables that are diffused in networks.¹¹ While our identification results extend to any SARMA process, our estimation framework and Monte Carlo simulation specialize to a simple SMA(1) process, or $(A, M) = (0, 1)$.

The next assumption generalizes expression (8), which characterizes the spatial extent of endogeneity, to the multivariate case. In particular, we associate a different characteristics matrix \mathbf{C}_k to each of the K individual observable characteristic.

Assumption 6. Multivariate Spatial Linear Endogeneity: *each column of \mathbf{X} is given, for $k = 1, \dots, K$, by:*

$$\mathbf{X}_{*,k} = \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_k + \xi_k \mathbf{C}_k \boldsymbol{v}, \quad (17)$$

where $\xi_k \in \mathbb{R}$, \mathbf{C}_k is an unrestricted characteristics matrix specific to the k -th covariate, while $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_k$ is a random vector with unrestricted but finite mean. In addition, we assume that $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_k$ has a continuous support, in the sense that for any two observations $i \neq j$, $\tilde{x}_{ki} = \tilde{x}_{kj}$ has probability zero; and moreover that for any two $k, k' = 1, \dots, K$, the probability limit $\Xi_{kk'} \equiv \text{plim} N^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^N (\tilde{x}_{ki} - \mathbb{E}[\tilde{x}_{ki}])(\tilde{x}_{k'i} - \mathbb{E}[\tilde{x}_{k'i}])$ is finite.

Notice a difference with the simpler one-characteristic case given in (8): in the latter, matrix \mathbf{C} multiplies the error terms ε_i 's of the model; in (17), each of the K characteristic matrices \mathbf{C}_k multiplies the “primitive” shocks v_i 's. We believe that this specification better captures a scenario where there are some external, unobservable factors (the primitive “common” shocks) that affect both individual outcomes and their characteristics, in a way that depends on the structure of social interactions as defined in our assumptions. However, our results about identification and estimation

¹¹In a study about the health outcomes of children, Christakis and Fowler (2013) find that most variables present a spatial autocorrelation in the space of friendship network up to two degrees of distance. Zacchia (2020) observes the same property for the R&D investment of high-tech firms that are connected through research collaborations. In addition, he argues that this property can follow from an underlying SMA(1) process of technological shock, and that it is a good approximation of a model of network formation driven by a homophily dynamic, where two firms link up with some probability only if their unobservables are similar.

would be easy to extend to a setup where the specification of endogeneity in (17) were to involve ε (which would still follow a generalized SARMA process) instead of \mathbf{v} .

Our final identification-related assumption is the following.

Assumption 7. Exogeneity of the spatial structures: *conditional upon the set $\mathcal{S} = \{\mathbf{G}; \mathbf{C}_1, \dots, \mathbf{C}_K; \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_1, \dots, \tilde{\mathbf{x}}_K\}$ that comprises: i. the network adjacency matrix, ii. the K characteristics matrices, and iii. the K independent component of the individual characteristics, the primitive shocks have mean zero and are homoscedastic:*

$$\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{v} | \mathcal{S}] = \mathbf{0} \quad (18)$$

$$\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{v}\mathbf{v}^\top | \mathcal{S}] = \sigma^2 \mathbf{I}. \quad (19)$$

This assumption generalizes (10) and (11) to the general model. As in the previous discussion about the simpler case, this assumption allows to isolate the source of endogeneity introduced via (17) from other confounding factors, such as the endogeneity of the networked structure of interaction or that of the characteristics structure.

We are now ready to state our main result. In what follows, we collect the parameters that characterize the spatial endogeneity with the vector $\boldsymbol{\xi} = (\xi_1, \dots, \xi_K)$.

Theorem 1. General Identification Result. *Under Assumptions 1-7, the parameters $\boldsymbol{\theta} \equiv (\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta, \boldsymbol{\xi}, \boldsymbol{\phi}, \boldsymbol{\psi}, \sigma^2)$ are almost surely identified if the matrices \mathbf{I} , \mathbf{G} , \mathbf{G}^2 and \mathbf{G}^3 are linearly independent; for every $k = 1, \dots, K$ it is $\beta\gamma_k + \delta_k \neq 0$; and the following three conditions hold simultaneously:*

- (a) *the researcher can observe some $P \geq 1 + A + M$ matrices $\{\mathbf{P}_p\}_{p=1}^P$ of size $N \times N$ that are all linearly independent of one another;*
- (b) *for all appropriate $(\boldsymbol{\phi}, \boldsymbol{\psi})$ all matrices in the following set:*

$$\{\mathbf{F}_a (\mathbf{I} - \phi_1 \mathbf{F}_1 - \dots - \phi_A \mathbf{F}_A)^{-1} (\mathbf{I} + \psi_1 \mathbf{E} + \dots + \psi_M \mathbf{E}_M)\}_{a=0}^A,$$

(where $\mathbf{F}_0 = \mathbf{I}$) are linearly independent of all matrices in the set $\{\mathbf{E}_m\}_{m=1}^M$;

- (c) *for every k , the four traces defined by the following expression for $q = 0, 1, 2, 3$:*

$$\text{Tr} [\mathbf{C}_k \mathbf{G}^{q-1} (\mathbf{I} - \phi_1 \mathbf{F}_1 - \dots - \phi_A \mathbf{F}_A)^{-1} (\mathbf{I} + \psi_1 \mathbf{E} + \dots + \psi_M \mathbf{E}_M)],$$

are not simultaneously all zeros.

Proof. See the Appendix. The proof is a generalization of Proposition 3. □

Theorem 1 provides a general identification result for linear-in-means models that feature contextual effects, when the observable characteristics of individuals, the error terms and the interaction structure itself are structurally dependent. In addition, we allow for an error term which is allowed to follow a very general stochastic process, and we show that under specific conditions the associated parameters are identified. The latter is, to the best of our knowledge, a novel result in the spatial econometrics literature, which so far has prevalently examined models whose errors follow simple spatially autoregressive processes.¹² It is instructive to discuss how the various parameters are identified in relation to the requirements of the theorem. We first focus on the “linear” parameters: in particular, the social (endogenous) effect, the contextual (exogenous) effects, and the endogeneity parameters $\boldsymbol{\xi}$; next, we separately elaborate on the various components of the SARMA structure of the error term’s variance.

First, observe that $\beta\gamma_k + \delta_k \neq 0$ is a standard condition for the identification of linear-in-means models, as it imposes that social and contextual effects do not cancel out. Next, consider that in our previous simplified analysis, if matrix \mathbf{G}^3 is linearly independent from \mathbf{I} , \mathbf{G} and \mathbf{G}^2 , another moment condition like (12) with $s = 3$ can be exploited for identification. In the general case we exploit QK sets of moments of the following kind, for $q = 1, \dots, Q$, $Q \geq 4$ and $k = 1, \dots, K$:

$$\mathbb{E} [\mathbf{x}_k \mathbf{G}^{q-1} \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}] - \lambda_{qk} = 0, \quad (20)$$

where λ_{qk} depends on the assumed SARMA process. In an extension of the intuition illustrated via Graph 3, once the endogeneity effect mediated by $\boldsymbol{\xi}$ is netted out the characteristics of friends of friends $\mathbf{G}^2 \mathbf{X}$ identify the contextual effect $\boldsymbol{\delta}$; whereas those of third degree indirect friends (“friends of friends of friends”), $\mathbf{G}^3 \mathbf{X}$ identify the social effect β . Note that condition (c), which is necessary for the identification of $\boldsymbol{\xi}$, corresponds with the “not all-zero traces” requirement from Proposition 3. Like that one, this condition is not very interesting: were it not to hold, endogeneity would not be a salient problem in the model.

Next, we consider the variance components. We identify them through standard covariance restrictions of the following kind, for $p = 1, \dots, P$:

$$\mathbb{E} [\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^T \mathbf{P}_p \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}] - \lambda_p = 0, \quad (21)$$

¹²For example, Kapoor et al. (2007); Kelejian and Prucha (2010); Drukker et al. (2013), among the others, analyze SAR(1) disturbances, while Lee and Liu (2010) consider higher order SAR processes.

where again λ_p may vary across cases. It appears that requirement (a) of the theorem is necessary in order to rule out collinearity between the P moments; this applies to both elements on the left-hand side of (21). A natural choice for the moment matrices is $\mathbf{P}_p = \mathbf{G}^{p-1}$, especially where P is small. Condition (b) instead might seem daunting at first, as it is conceived for quite general situations. It is helpful to evaluate it in a simpler scenario, which might work well in most empirical applications, where the error term follows a first-order SARMA process with $(A, M) = (1, 1)$, and where the network structure accurately describes both components, that is $\mathbf{E}_1 = \mathbf{F}_1 = \mathbf{G}$. In this case, condition (b) simply requires that the adjacency matrix \mathbf{G} and matrix that can be expressed as:

$$(\mathbf{I} - \phi_1 \mathbf{G})^{-1} (\mathbf{I} + \psi_1 \mathbf{G}) \simeq \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \phi_1^s \mathbf{G}^{s+1} (\mathbf{I} + \psi_1 \mathbf{G}),$$

are linearly independent, which is typically automatically verified for those non-fully transitive, sparse networks that we consider as empirical settings.

We conclude our treatment of identification with a discussion on the realism and applicability of our assumptions. Our hypotheses about the spatial correlation structure of the error term (Assumption 5), the formulation of endogeneity (Assumption 6) and the network of social interactions (Theorem 1) are quite general and they can accommodate a wide variety of settings. Our key hypotheses are two: first, that both the network and the characteristic matrices are exogenous (Assumption 7); second, that the researchers know the characteristics matrices \mathbf{C}_k up to ξ_k for $k = 1, \dots, K$. Exogeneity of the network is a standard condition in this literature; as argued, while in future work this assumption shall be relaxed, in this paper it allows us to focus on our “spatial” endogeneity mechanism. Conversely, information about the characteristic structures for each covariate may be difficult to obtain in empirical applications; while it is not required that the *intensity* of endogeneity is known (the ξ_k parameters are identified and can be estimated) lack of knowledge about its spatial *structure* can lead to misspecification. In such cases, we still advocate to use our approach as a testing tool (for example, in robustness checks) to verify that the results are not driven by the spatial cross-correlation between observed and unobserved characteristics. We illustrate our approach in our empirical application, where conventional estimators deliver statistically significant social effects, but we are concerned whether these are driven by some instance of correlated effects.

3.4 Extensions

Finally, we analyze two simple extensions of our framework. First, we show how it can accommodate multiple networks and the relative fixed effects. Next, we discuss how the primitive parameters μ and ν from our analytical framework, which are combined in β , can be identified under certain conditions.

Network-level fixed effects

The use of the third power of \mathbf{G} bears some analogies with the scenario analyzed by Bramoullé et al. (2009), where the adjacency matrix represents a set of disconnected networks, to each of which is associated a separate fixed effect, and where the use of indirect connections of third degree is necessary once such fixed effects are partialled out. The difference is that here, it is the endogeneity expressed in (17) which is being removed first. The following corollary is consequent to this one last observation.

Corollary 1. *If the model of interest is:*

$$\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{D}\boldsymbol{\alpha}^* + \beta\mathbf{G}\mathbf{y} + \mathbf{X}\boldsymbol{\gamma} + \mathbf{G}\mathbf{X}\boldsymbol{\delta} + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}, \quad (22)$$

where \mathbf{D} represents a set of D dummy variables, each for a separate component of the network \mathcal{G} , and $\boldsymbol{\alpha}^* = (\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_D)$ is a vector of associated fixed effects, the parameters $\boldsymbol{\theta} \equiv (\boldsymbol{\alpha}^*, \beta, \boldsymbol{\gamma}, \boldsymbol{\delta}, \boldsymbol{\xi}, \boldsymbol{\phi}, \boldsymbol{\psi}, \sigma^2)$ are identified if, in addition to the conditions expressed in Theorem 1, also matrix \mathbf{G}^4 is linearly independent of matrices \mathbf{I} , \mathbf{G} , \mathbf{G}^2 and \mathbf{G}^3 .

Proof. This follows straightforwardly from “network differencing” equation (22) by pre-multiplying the data (\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{y}) by $\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{G}$ as in Bramoullé et al. (2009). The identification of the differenced model would follow as per our previous analysis with $\boldsymbol{\alpha} = 0$; the resulting moments are a function of \mathbf{G}^4 which thus must be linearly independent of its lower powers. The fixed effects $\boldsymbol{\alpha}^*$ are residually identified as a subnetwork-specific set of intercepts. \square

Identification of μ and ν

In our framework, parameter β represents a composite equilibrium effect: it encloses the direct effect of peers’ effort, ν , amplified by the equilibrium response of individual

effort, $(1 - \mu)^{-1}$. Because of Assumption 3 (row-normalization of \mathbf{G}) the two parameters μ and ν disappear from the reduced form equilibrium equation. However, note that when this hypothesis is dropped, under our framework (6) would become:

$$\mathbf{y} = (\alpha - \zeta) \boldsymbol{\iota} + \beta \mathbf{G}\mathbf{y} + \gamma \mathbf{x} + \zeta \bar{\mathbf{g}} + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}, \quad (23)$$

where $\zeta \equiv (1 - \mu)^{-1} \nu \log \mu$ and $\bar{\mathbf{g}} \equiv \mathbf{G}\boldsymbol{\iota}$ is the vector of individual in-degrees (the overall strength of all one individual's connections, such that $\bar{g}_i = \sum_{j=1}^N g_{ij}$). Since $\exp(\zeta/\beta) = \mu$, if the observable characteristics x_i 's and the network \mathcal{G} are exogenous the primitive parameters μ and ν are separately identified in (23). The intuition is straightforward: the variation in individual in-degree $\bar{\mathbf{g}}$ conveys additional information about the overall strength of direct spillovers (expressed by the parameter ν).¹³ An individual with more friends or a firm with more connections is likely to enjoy more beneficial externalities. While row-normalization is routinely assumed in studies of peer effects, we find the latter to be a realistic hypothesis.¹⁴

In our framework, μ and ν are separately identified also under a mildly restrictive instance of endogeneity.

Corollary 2. *Under the conditions expressed by Theorem 1 but Assumption 3, if $\bar{\mathbf{g}}$ is linearly independent of the unit vector $\boldsymbol{\iota}$ or any other covariate $\mathbf{X}_{\cdot,k}$ and, in addition, $\mathbb{E}[\bar{\mathbf{g}}^T \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}] = 0$ holds, then parameters μ and ν are separately identified.*

Proof. Re-define the moments from the proof of Theorem 1 in terms of the residual $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}(\boldsymbol{\theta}, \zeta) = \mathbf{y} - (\alpha - \zeta) \boldsymbol{\iota} - \beta \mathbf{G}\mathbf{y} - \mathbf{X}\boldsymbol{\gamma} - \mathbf{G}\mathbf{X}\boldsymbol{\delta} - \zeta \bar{\mathbf{g}}$, and add $\mathbb{E}[\bar{\mathbf{g}}^T \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}(\boldsymbol{\theta}, \zeta)] = 0$ to the set. Clearly, this does not affect the full rank properties of the moments' Jacobian. \square

Essentially, if the observable characteristics are endogenous as per Assumption 6, *but the intensity of individual connections is independent of individual unobservables*, μ and ν can be separately identified by adding the additional regressor \bar{g}_i . Note that some form of statistical dependence of the adjacency matrix \mathbf{G} on the characteristics matrices \mathbf{C}_k is still allowed. Scenarios where the identifying assumption are violated are obvious: a very skilled pupil or a very successful firm may find themselves with

¹³Note that the exact relationship between β , μ and ν depends on functional form assumptions of our model, but the intuition is more general.

¹⁴If individual "effort" e_i is observable, an alternative route for the separate identification of μ and ν would be based on the structural "production function" (2): this is the approach taken in studies of R&D spillovers, since researchers can typically observe the R&D expenditures of firms.

more or more intense connections. In future work, it would be interesting to examine under what conditions μ and ν can be separately identified even if the hypothesis in question fails.

4 Estimation

The moment conditions that support our main identification results lend themselves naturally to GMM estimation. In this section we describe how the estimation framework introduced by Lee (2007a) can be adapted to our assumed forms of endogeneity. In doing so, we specialize – as mentioned earlier – to a simple stochastic process that governs our the error term: a spatial moving average of first degree. This facilitates the asymptotic analysis, yet the results can be extended to any SARMA process.

Assumption 8. SMA(1) Unobservables: $\phi = \mathbf{0}$ and $\psi_m = 0$ for $m \geq 2$.

In what follows, we write $\psi = \psi_1$ and $\theta = (\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta, \xi, \psi, \sigma^2)$. We also denote the true parameter values as θ_0 , we introduce N subscripts, and we define the following matrices for $q = 1, \dots, Q$:

$$\mathbf{Q}_{q,N} \equiv \mathbf{X}_N^T \mathbf{G}_N^{q-1}.$$

Our GMM estimator is based on a set of $1 + QK + P$ moments conditions, with $Q \geq 4$ and $P \geq 2$:

$$\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{m}_N(\theta_0)] - \lambda_N(\theta_0) = \mathbf{0}. \quad (24)$$

To better describe our moment conditions, express the structural residual as:

$$\varepsilon_N(\theta) = \mathbf{y}_N - \alpha \mathbf{1}_N - \beta \mathbf{G}_N \mathbf{y}_N - \mathbf{X}_N \gamma - \mathbf{G}_N \mathbf{X}_N \delta,$$

hence, it is:

$$\mathbf{m}_N(\theta) = \left[\mathbf{1}^T \varepsilon_N(\theta) \quad \cdots \quad \varepsilon_N^T(\theta) \mathbf{Q}_{q,N}^T \quad \cdots \quad \varepsilon_N^T(\theta) \mathbf{P}_{p,N} \varepsilon_N(\theta) \quad \cdots \right]^T,$$

for $q = 1, \dots, Q$ and $p = 1, \dots, P$. As for vector $\lambda_N(\theta)$, its first element is given by $\lambda_{1,N}(\theta) = 0$, while the others are:

$$\lambda_{1+qk,N}(\theta) \equiv \sigma^2 \xi_k \text{Tr} \left[\mathbf{C}_{k,N}^T \mathbf{G}_N^{q-1} (\mathbf{I}_N + \psi \mathbf{E}_N) \right],$$

for $q = 1, \dots, Q$ and $k = 1, \dots, K$; and:

$$\lambda_{1+QK+p,N}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \equiv \sigma^2 \text{Tr} \left[(\mathbf{I}_N + \boldsymbol{\psi} \mathbf{E}_N)^\top \mathbf{P}_{p,N} (\mathbf{I}_N + \boldsymbol{\psi} \mathbf{E}_N) \right],$$

for $p = 1, \dots, P$. For some $\boldsymbol{\theta}$, the sample moments are, simply:

$$\bar{\mathbf{m}}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \equiv \frac{1}{N} [\mathbf{m}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta}) - \boldsymbol{\lambda}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta})], \quad (25)$$

while our GMM estimator $\hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{GMM}$ is the usual minimizer in the parameter space Θ :

$$\hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{GMM} = \arg \min_{\boldsymbol{\theta} \in \Theta} \bar{\mathbf{m}}_N^\top(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \mathbf{W}_N \bar{\mathbf{m}}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta}), \quad (26)$$

where \mathbf{W}_N is a weighting matrix. We derive the asymptotic properties of the estimator under the following additional assumptions.

Assumption 9. Bounded Parameter Space: Θ is bounded.

Assumption 10. Probability Limits of the Covariates: the independent component of x_{ik} are such that $N^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^N (\tilde{x}_{ik} - \mathbb{E}[\tilde{x}_{ik}]) = o_P(1)$ for all $k = 1, \dots, K$.

Assumptions 9 and 10 are regularity conditions that are necessary to ensure consistency of the GMM estimator.

Assumption 11. Bounded Characteristics: matrix $\mathbf{C}_{k,N}$ is bounded by $\bar{C}_k < \infty$, that is $\sum_{j=1}^N c_{k,ij} < \bar{C}_k$ for $i = 1, \dots, N$, for all $k = 1, \dots, K$.

Assumption 12. Bounded Adjacencies: the network's adjacency matrix \mathbf{G}_N and its corresponding Leontiev inverse $(\mathbf{I}_N - \beta_0 \mathbf{G}_N)^{-1}$ are uniformly bounded in both row and column sums in absolute value.

Assumption 13. Bounded Moment Matrices: all the matrices $(\mathbf{Q}_{1,N}, \dots, \mathbf{Q}_{Q,N})$ and $(\mathbf{P}_{1,N}, \dots, \mathbf{P}_{P,N})$ used in the moment conditions are all uniformly bounded in both row and column sums in absolute value.

Assumptions 11-13 all ensure that the moments in question have finite variance. Note that Assumptions 12-13 have their analogues in Lee (2007a), while Assumption 11 is specific to our framework. Also observe that bounded adjacencies are implied by the row normalization of \mathbf{G}_N . Yet Assumption 12 may be useful when row normalization is dropped, e.g. if interest falls on the separate identification of $\boldsymbol{\mu}$ and $\boldsymbol{\nu}$.

Under these assumptions, one can derive standard asymptotic properties for our GMM estimator.

Theorem 2. Asymptotics of the GMM estimator. *Under Assumptions 1-13, $\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{GMM}$ is a consistent estimator of $\boldsymbol{\theta}_0$ and has the following limiting distribution:*

$$\sqrt{N} \left(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{GMM} - \boldsymbol{\theta}_0 \right) \xrightarrow{d} \mathcal{N} \left(\mathbf{0}, \left[\mathbf{J}_0^T \mathbf{W}_0 \mathbf{J}_0 \right]^{-1} \mathbf{J}_0^T \mathbf{W}_0 \boldsymbol{\Omega}_0 \mathbf{W}_0 \mathbf{J}_0 \left[\mathbf{J}_0^T \mathbf{A}_0 \mathbf{J}_0 \right]^{-1} \right)$$

where: *i.* $\boldsymbol{\Omega}_0 \equiv \text{plim} \frac{1}{N} \text{Var} [\mathbf{m}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta}_0)]$; *ii.* $\mathbf{J}_0 \equiv \text{plim} \frac{\partial}{\partial \boldsymbol{\theta}^T} \overline{\mathbf{m}}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta}_0)$; *iii.* $\mathbf{W}_0 \equiv \text{plim} \mathbf{W}_N$.


Proof. See the Appendix. The proof is based on the results by Lee (2007a), which in turn rely on White (1996) as well as Kelejian and Prucha (2001). \square

The choice of the optimal weighting matrix \mathbf{W}_N is informed by the same considerations advanced by Lee (2007a), to whom we refer for the details (we use a parallel notation for the moment matrices $\mathbf{Q}_{q,N}$ and $\mathbf{P}_{p,N}$ for ease of comparison). Extending this result to more general SARMA processes or to heteroscedastic primitive shocks is conceptually straightforward but analytically tedious.

5 Monte Carlo

We evaluate the performance of our GMM estimator in Monte Carlo simulations. In particular, we simulate a minimal d.g.p.: the SAR model (6) with one covariate and no contextual effects ($\delta = 0$), combined with the simple setup of linear endogeneity given in (8). We also let the error term to follow a simple first order spatial moving average process which is a function of \mathbf{G} : $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon} = (\mathbf{I} + \boldsymbol{\psi} \mathbf{G}) \boldsymbol{\nu}$. In addition, we construct a homogeneous, “fully segregated” characteristics matrix \mathbf{C} which – in our baseline case – is composed by 50 “groups” of size 10. We generate a new matrix \mathbf{G} in each repetition of every simulation, in order to minimize the dependence of our results from a specific network matrix. Specifically, each matrix \mathbf{G} is randomly generated through the ‘small-world’ algorithm by Watts and Strogatz (1998); by this procedure, all observations are first ordered along a line and connected to an even number of φ neighbors; next, links are reshuffled with some probability π (connections are unweighted, that is $g_{ij} \in \{0, 1\}$). Given that the initial ordering of observations corresponds with the one used for defining the characteristics matrix, \mathbf{G} and \mathbf{C} are guaranteed to have some degree of overlap, although not a complete one.

We represent the structure of interactions that results from these choices through the following graphical example. In Graph 4, 10 nodes are ordered along a line, and split in two symmetrical groups – each of size 5 – which characterize \mathbf{C} . Through a small-world algorithm with $\varphi = 2$, all nodes are connected in the network with their immediate neighbors on the line, but three links are reshuffled so that the resulting matrix \mathbf{G} is irregular.



Graph 4: The Small World Algorithm and Partial overlap of \mathbf{C} and \mathbf{G} : Example

Notes. In this graph, nodes represents simulated observations, edges denote simulated social interactions expressed through matrix \mathbf{G} , whereas groups of observations bound within dash-dotted squares depict a fully segregated characteristics structure encoded in \mathbf{C} . Dotted edges denote connections that are erased and reshuffled according to the “small world” algorithm by Watts and Strogatz (1998).

In all simulations we set the sample size $N = 500$. In our baseline set of repetitions, we set the following parameters:¹⁵

$$(\alpha_0, \beta_0, \gamma_0, \xi_0, \psi_0, \sigma_0) = (.25, .4, .5, .1, .25, .05) \quad (27)$$

note that ψ_0 amounts to five times the standard deviation of the primitive shocks v_i , which results in substantial endogeneity. In addition, we set $\varphi = 2$ and $\pi = 0.25$ in the network-generation algorithm. Over 1,000 repetitions, we estimate our model

¹⁵Furthermore, we set $\text{Var}[\tilde{x}_i] = 0.09$, but we are not interested in estimating this parameter.

with equally-weighted moment conditions of order $Q = 3$ and $P = 2$, where $\mathbf{P}_1 = \mathbf{I}$ and $\mathbf{P}_1 = \mathbf{G}$. We also compare our estimates of (α, β, γ) with those obtained through OLS as well as through an IV estimator where $\mathbf{G}\mathbf{x}$ is used as an instrument for $\mathbf{G}\mathbf{y}$. Finally, we repeat the exercise by selectively altering key parameters, one at a time, with respect to the baseline. The results are reported in Tables 1 and 2.

Table 1: Monte Carlo Simulations (part one)

	Baseline			$\beta = 0.50$		
	PFZ	IV	OLS	PFZ	IV	OLS
α	0.256 (0.040)	0.082 (0.018)	0.044 (0.015)	0.254 (0.038)	0.081 (0.020)	0.041 (0.015)
β	0.385 (0.095)	0.802 (0.044)	0.894 (0.035)	0.492 (0.075)	0.839 (0.039)	0.918 (0.029)
γ	0.496 (0.050)	0.288 (0.034)	0.229 (0.029)	0.497 (0.050)	0.292 (0.035)	0.232 (0.029)
ξ	0.100 (0.013)	–	–	0.100 (0.013)	–	–
ψ	0.270 (0.010)	–	–	0.260 (0.090)	–	–
σ	0.050 (0.005)	–	–	0.050 (0.004)	–	–

	$\gamma = 0.2$			$\psi = 0$		
	PFZ	IV	OLS	PFZ	IV	OLS
α	0.252 (0.065)	-0.144 (0.056)	-0.048 (0.017)	0.253 (0.036)	0.046 (0.024)	0.036 (0.019)
β	0.395 (0.156)	1.347 (0.133)	1.115 (0.042)	0.392 (0.086)	0.891 (0.057)	0.913 (0.046)
γ	0.188 (0.042)	-0.133 (0.064)	-0.040 (0.027)	0.499 (0.053)	0.190 (0.046)	0.176 (0.038)
ξ	0.100 (0.013)	–	–	0.996 (0.107)	–	–
ψ	0.267 (0.170)	–	–	0.037 (0.048)	–	–
σ	0.050 (0.005)	–	–	0.050 (0.004)	–	–

Notes. Each column in this table reports the median and the standard deviation (in parentheses) of the relevant parameter estimates across 1,000 repetitions each with $N = 500$. ‘PFZ’ denotes our proposed estimator, ‘IV’ the estimator obtained by instrumenting $\mathbf{G}\mathbf{y}$ with $\mathbf{G}\mathbf{x}$, while ‘OLS’ is self-explanatory. The baseline scenario is summarized by (27), $\varphi = 2$, $\pi = 0.25$, and groups of size 10 in \mathbf{C} .

Table 2: Monte Carlo Simulations (part two)

	$\xi = 0$			Group Size: 5		
	PFZ	IV	OLS	PFZ	IV	OLS
α	0.254 (0.044)	0.251 (0.028)	0.104 (0.018)	0.251 (0.016)	0.211 (0.009)	0.179 (0.011)
β	0.389 (0.106)	0.398 (0.067)	0.749 (0.044)	0.397 (0.038)	0.494 (0.022)	0.571 (0.026)
γ	0.499 (0.055)	0.498 (0.043)	0.303 (0.037)	0.497 (0.050)	0.292 (0.035)	0.232 (0.029)
ξ	0.004 (0.005)	–	–	0.101 (0.026)	–	–
ψ	0.259 (0.134)	–	–	0.245 (0.053)	–	–
σ^2	0.050 (0.002)	–	–	0.050 (0.002)	–	–

	$\varphi = 4$			$\pi = 0.9$		
	PFZ	IV	OLS	PFZ	IV	OLS
α	0.263 (0.056)	0.027 (0.037)	-0.012 (0.026)	0.242 (0.038)	0.116 (0.016)	0.099 (0.013)
β	0.368 (0.135)	0.935 (0.088)	1.029 (0.061)	0.420 (0.092)	0.723 (0.037)	0.762 (0.032)
γ	0.506 (0.060)	0.226 (0.058)	0.173 (0.044)	0.491 (0.034)	0.418 (0.025)	0.402 (0.023)
ξ	0.102 (0.016)	–	–	0.093 (0.021)	–	–
ψ	0.273 (0.140)	–	–	0.228 (0.144)	–	–
σ^2	0.050 (0.003)	–	–	0.049 (0.004)	–	–

Notes. See the notes accompanying Table 1.

In our baseline simulations, our proposed estimator appears to be quite accurate. While it slightly underestimates β (on average) it contrasts with both OLS and IV estimators, which estimate β about twice as large. We obtain similar results when we set different values of β or γ , or when the primitive shocks v_i and the error terms ε_i coincide ($\psi = 0$). If we silence the characteristics matrix channel ($\xi = 0$) IV becomes consistent; however, it behaves similarly as our proposed GMM estimator. The more interesting implications are obtained by altering the parameters that define matrices \mathbf{C} and \mathbf{G} . By halving the size of groups in the characteristics matrix, endogeneity is

reduced; however, our GMM method still provides accurate estimates, unlike IV or OLS. Increasing the density of \mathbf{G} (by setting $\varphi = 4$) does not seem to significantly affect the simulated estimates; however, increasing the randomness of links ($\pi = 0.9$) results in β to be slightly overestimated (instead of underestimated) on average. To summarize, it appears that our GMM method – while consistent and preferable to the standard IV estimator – is as usual biased in small samples, in a way that depends upon the characteristics of the underlying networks.

6 Empirical Application

To illustrate how our proposed method can help account for correlated effects in an actual empirical study about social effects, we leverage the setting and data from the influential study by De Giorgi et al. (2010). This contribution estimates peer effects between students who started their undergraduate studies at Bocconi University in Italy in 1998.¹⁶ A key feature of this paper is that peer groups are shaped according to a non-overlapping, networked structure of social interactions \mathcal{G} that is determined exogenously. Specifically, students from different undergraduate programs at Bocconi University used to take common foundational courses over their first year and a half of curriculum; there were multiple, parallel version of each common course, and students were randomly allocated into them. Students are defined as “peers” over the later part of their curriculum if they attended together a given number of common courses out of seven (this number is set as four in the authors’ preferred specification).¹⁷ We refer to the original paper for a full-fledged description of the setting and data.

We estimate the simple SAR model (6) on the data provided by De Giorgi et al. (2010) using the same network matrix \mathbf{G} from their favorite specification of the peer structure (which is row-normalized). However, our model differs from theirs in several respects. First, to keep the analysis simple we abstract from contextual effects, and therefore we abstain from specifying a complete linear-in-means model. Furthermore, we choose different outcome and explanatory variables. In the original paper, y_i is

¹⁶Bocconi University offers undergraduate and graduate programs in Economics, Finance, Business Administration, and – to a lesser extent – in other Social Sciences.

¹⁷There were in total nine common courses, of which two were in legal subjects and were excluded by the authors. The two law classes had unusually low attendance rates and thus a lower number of parallel sessions; consequently, including them in the count would inappropriately inflate the number of peers that each student has.

a dummy variable that denotes major choice (Economics vs. Business), whereas in our case it denotes the Bocconi GPA that excludes the initial common courses. We choose not to use a dummy variable as our main dependent variable so as to avoid contradictions between our estimated model and our maintained assumptions about the error term. Furthermore, in order to keep our illustrative application simple we use only one right-hand side variable x_i : the grade that a student has received in the high school final exams.¹⁸ In the original paper, the authors use other right-hand side variables, including the score achieved in the Bocconi admission test and a dummy variable encoding whether a student had indicated Economics as the preferred major at the time of applying at Bocconi. We find that these variables have little predictive power over our chosen y_i outcome.

While we believe that our chosen x_i variable is representative of a student’s prior educational achievements or background, it is certainly not devoid of problems. First, it is arguably endogenous: it is likely to depend upon the unobserved individual ability or motivation (which are encoded in the error term ε_i) alongside our outcome variable y_i . This would be not so much of a problem for the sake of estimating social effects if such unobserved components were independent across students. It turns out that there are reasons to suspect the existence of cross-correlation between the error terms of different students, and that it occurs along geographical lines. Note that Bocconi is a prestigious university within Italy, certainly not a cheap one to attend by national standards;¹⁹ while located in Milan in Lombardy, about half of its student body hails from outside that region. For such students the cost of attending Bocconi is higher in comparative terms; thus, they are likely to be representative of a more (self-)selected subset of the population of potential students. This may be especially true for those students coming from the regions of central and southern Italy with a markedly lower income per capita (about one fourth of our sample).

In light of these observations, we model endogeneity similarly to (8):

$$x_i = \tilde{x}_i + \xi\varepsilon_i, \tag{28}$$

¹⁸In Italy, completion of high school is conditional upon passing a centrally-managed nationwide exam (which differs by type of high school); marks in this exam are awarded on a scale of 100 with 60 being the passing mark.

¹⁹In making these claims, we would like to remark that neither of us has graduated from or been employed at Bocconi University. One of us briefly attended one of its undergraduate programs before dropping out, and he was later rejected by its flagship Master’s program in Economics.

while introducing cross-correlation in the error term as follows:

$$\varepsilon_i = \sum_{i=1}^N c_{ij} \nu_i, \quad (29)$$

with $c_{ii} = 1$ for $i = 1, \dots, N$. Together, (28) and (29) are combined as a specification of the high-school mark x_i that is consistent with Assumption 6 and hence, with our econometric model (the weights c_{ij} are collected in matrix \mathbf{C}). Note that (29) treats the error term as a spatial MA(1) process with a fixed parameter;²⁰ although we could estimate this parameter through our procedure, we prefer to assume the entire spatial structure of the errors so as to keep the analysis as simple as possible.

Specifically, we experiment with two alternative structures, defined in terms of the spatial correlation of the error term that is expressed by matrix $\mathbf{C}\mathbf{C}^T$. In both cases, the spatial correlation is normalized by the sample size N so as to comply with our statistical assumptions illustrated in Section 4. The two structures are as follows.

1. The first, denoted as $\mathcal{C}_{(1)}$, is such that $\text{Cov}(\varepsilon_i, \varepsilon_j) = \sigma/N$ if students i and j originate from the same “historical area” of Italy, and $\text{Cov}(\varepsilon_i, \varepsilon_j) = 0$ otherwise. We define as “historical areas” those polities with a shared history, subculture and economic structure that existed on the Italian territory before the process of Italian unification was set in motion in 1859.²¹
2. The second, denoted as $\mathcal{C}_{(2)}$, is such that $\text{Cov}(\varepsilon_i, \varepsilon_j) = \exp(-D \cdot d_{ij}) \cdot \sigma/N$ for every pair (i, j) , where d_{ij} is the distance between the geographical centroids of two students’ *provinces* of origin²² while $D > 0$ is a constant. The resulting spatial correlation of ε_i is consistent with distance decay as in (9).

In both cases, we calculate the characteristics matrix \mathbf{C} by factorizing the target spatial correlation structure via eigendecomposition; hence, weights c_{ij} can be interpreted as the relative importance of student j on the variance of student i ’s characteristics. We believe both structures to be potentially capable of capturing the correlated effects

²⁰This model implied by (28) and (29) can be written as $\mathbf{x} = \tilde{\mathbf{x}} + \xi\mathbf{C}\mathbf{v}$, and it is equivalent to a model expressed as $\mathbf{x} = \tilde{\mathbf{x}} + \xi\mathbf{C}'\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}$ where $\mathbf{C}' = \mathbf{I}$ and $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon} = (\mathbf{I} + \psi\mathbf{E})\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{C}\mathbf{v}$.

²¹We consider the two small historical duchies of Parma-Piacenza and Modena-Reggio as one such polity. We also experimented with alternative subdivisions, including one based on the classification, within the Romance linguistic family, of the regional language that is prevalent in each province (in Italy, traditional regional languages are still widely spoken); in all cases we obtained similar results.

²²Provinces are traditional administrative units of Italy, equivalent to the NUTS-3 level. In 1998 there were 101 provinces. We set $d_{ij} = 0$ if $i = j$ or the two students hail from the same province.

that can potentially jeopardize the identification of social effects.²³

Before presenting our estimation results, it is worthwhile to discuss raw patterns of spatial correlation in the data, for both the explanatory variable x_i and the outcome y_i . Specifically, we calculate the Moran’s I statistic and its associated standard error (Kelejian and Prucha, 2001), for the two variables in question and for alternative characteristics structures \mathcal{C} , using a modified version of \mathbf{CC}^T (such that all diagonal elements are set at zero) as the weight matrix. For structure $\mathcal{C}_{(2)}$, we experiment with two fairly spaced values of D , that is $D \in \{2, 6\}$. The results are reported in Table 3. Notably, the spatial correlation in final high school grades x_i is calculated as about 0.10 for structure $\mathcal{C}_{(1)}$, and within the range 0.04-0.07 (depending on the value of D) for structure $\mathcal{C}_{(2)}$. This suggests that that our structures of choice explain at least in part the co-dependence of x_i across students. Conversely, the Moran’s I statistics for the later Bocconi GPA y_i is calculated at typically smaller values (between 0.01 and 0.02) across all structures \mathcal{C} . According to our econometric framework, these patterns could results from correlated effects that propagate across the observations of both x_i and y_i if the parameter that drives endogeneity, that is ξ , is positive. Note that the standard errors associated with all six estimated Moran’s I statistics are very small, which is customary in analyses about spatial correlation.

Table 3: Empirical Application: Moran’s I Statistics

	Variable: x_i			Variable: y_i		
	$\mathcal{C}_{(1)}$	$\mathcal{C}_{(2)}$	$\mathcal{C}_{(2)}$	$\mathcal{C}_{(1)}$	$\mathcal{C}_{(2)}$	$\mathcal{C}_{(2)}$
Moran’s I	0.099 (0.001)	0.043 (0.001)	0.067 (0.001)	0.016 (0.001)	0.010 (0.001)	0.019 (0.001)
D	–	2	6	–	2	6

Notes. This table reports the Moran’s I statistic, as well as its associated standard error (in parentheses), for the indicated variables and structures \mathcal{C} , using a modified version of \mathbf{CC}^T (with all diagonal elements set at zero) as the Moran weight matrix. For structures of the $\mathcal{C}_{(2)}$ type, the table reports results for two different values of D , as indicated in the bottom row (if applicable). Across all calculations the sample size equals $N = 1,141$.

The analysis of the Moran’s I statistics does not allow to draw conclusion about the extent of endogeneity or the existence of some residual spatial correlation in the outcome variable y_i that can be interpreted as peer effects. Instead, estimating our

²³We treat non-Italian students (who represent less than 2 per cent of the sample) as follows: in $\mathcal{C}_{(1)}$ they are identified as a separate block in the spatial correlation matrix \mathbf{CC}^T , whereas in $\mathcal{C}_{(2)}$ they are treated as hailing from an additional, very distant “province.”

model would allow to tackle both questions at once. The empirical estimates based on our GMM framework presented in Section 4, alongside other estimates that are based on more conventional methods, are displayed in Table 4. We focus our discussion on the key parameters β and ξ . The first column displays the OLS estimates of the SAR model (6), which delivers an estimate of $\beta \simeq 0.12$ that is not statistically significant. Since OLS is by construction inconsistent in this setting, we attempt 2SLS estimation based on instrument sets *à la* Bramoullé et al. (2009) of varying size. Both attempts register similar values of $\beta \simeq 0.34$: in addition to being sizable, these estimates are also statistically significant. If this result were confirmed, it would provide the basis for policy interventions motivated on a social multiplier of about $1/(1 - \beta) \simeq 1.51$.

Table 4: Empirical Application: Model Estimates

	OLS/IV			PFZ		
	OLS	IV	2SLS	$\mathcal{C}_{(1)}$	$\mathcal{C}_{(2)}$	$\mathcal{C}_{(2)}$
α	14.151*** (2.428)	8.399*** (3.653)	8.164*** (3.680)	16.951*** (0.858)	17.308*** (0.830)	17.052*** (0.851)
β	0.117 (0.089)	0.334** (0.136)	0.343** (0.137)	-0.026 (0.037)	-0.003 (0.031)	-0.019 (0.036)
γ	11.287*** (0.521)	11.258*** (0.523)	11.257*** (0.523)	12.571*** (0.753)	11.374*** (0.397)	12.203*** (0.730)
ξ	–	–	–	9.150** (3.892)	6.541*** (2.435)	10.631** (4.794)
σ	–	–	–	1.596*** (0.020)	1.591*** (0.018)	1.593*** (0.019)
D	–	–	–	–	2	6
N	1,141	1,141	1,141	1,141	1,141	1,141

Notes. Each column in this table reports estimates of model (6) performed on the data by De Giorgi et al. (2010), using the variables y_i and x_i described in the text. The first three columns report either OLS, IV or 2SLS results, where: ‘OLS’ is self-explanatory; the ‘IV’ estimates are obtained by instrumenting \mathbf{Gy} with \mathbf{Gx} , while the ‘2SLS’ estimates use both \mathbf{Gx} and $\mathbf{G}^2\mathbf{x}$ as instruments. The remaining three columns display the results obtained by our estimator (‘PFZ’) assuming different structures \mathcal{C} . For structures of the $\mathcal{C}_{(2)}$ type, the table reports the results for two different values of D , which are indicated in the bottom row if applicable. The sample size is denoted by N . Asterisk series: *, ** and *** denote statistical significance of point estimates respectively at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent level.

The last three columns of Table 4 – those grouped under the label ‘PFZ’ – report the estimates based on our framework for the same characteristics structures used to calculate the Moran’s I statistics. The pattern is similar across the three cases. Most notably, for every characteristic structure β is estimated negative and not statistically

significant. In addition, ξ is estimated statistically significant, with point estimates ranging from about 6.5 to about 10.6. These results suggest that our method, however crudely implemented and despite relying on precise assumptions about the structure of spatial correlation, has the potential to turn around empirical estimates of network effects that, while registered by conventional methods, are suspected to be the consequence of correlated effects. This observation could prove useful to researchers intent on verifying whether their estimates of network effects are indeed robust. We also find it interesting to observe that while our estimates of ξ register endogeneity, the estimates for γ do not differ much across the six specifications reported in Table 4.²⁴ This suggests that estimates of network effects are more sensitive, relative to standard regressors, to the kind of endogeneity that we examine in this paper.

7 Conclusion

In this paper we have shown that, under certain configurations of the underlying socio-economic relationships that determine the characteristics and relevant outcomes of economic agents, it is possible to identify and estimate peer or social effects within a standard spatial econometric framework, even if the right-hand side characteristics are themselves endogenous. The requirements for identification are quite general: it suffices that the network of social interactions is exogenous, not fully-overlapping in only a slightly stronger sense relative to the identification conditions by Bramoullé et al. (2009), and that the spatial structure of endogeneity (the dependence of individual covariates on peers' unobservables) is known by the econometrician up to a multiplicative constant. This approach can be applied to studies about peer effects where the the right-hand side individual characteristics used for identification are possibly endogenous and affected by correlated effects. In our empirical application based on the study by De Giorgi et al. (2010), we show that applying our approach under different specifications of the spatial structure of endogeneity leads to precise zero estimates of the social effects, where conventional methods would instead estimate positive and statistically significant effects.

We envision three areas for future work. First, we plan to extend our approach

²⁴The typical estimate of γ is about 12. The interpretation of this figure is that every 10 additional points that students receive in their final high school exam translate, on average, into a later Bocconi GPA which is higher by 1.2 points on a scale of 30.

to more general specifications of the stochastic process driving endogeneity, such as non-linear ones or with conditionally heteroscedastic primitive errors. To this end, we plan to investigate the applicability of semi-parametric estimators or control function approaches that are less reliant upon linear functional forms. Second, we plan to relax the assumption about exogeneity of the network \mathcal{G} , by incorporating either control function methods *à la* Arduini et al. (2015) or Johnsson and Moon (2021), or a GMM approach for panel data in the spirit of Kuersteiner and Prucha (2020).²⁵ Third, and last, we believe it would be worthwhile to integrate the recent literature that exploits penalized estimators in order to recover an unknown network structure (Rose, 2017b; De Paula et al., 2018) within our framework. Specifically, we believe that with partial information about the network structure, this kind of approaches may help identify an unknown characteristics structure \mathcal{C} , or the SARMA structure of the error term, and thus mitigate the main requirement of our approach: that is, the *a priori* knowledge of the structure in question.

²⁵Note that in our setup, it is already possible to relax this assumption. Consider for example the simple linear specification of endogeneity discussed at length in subsection 3.2. If (10) were replaced with:

$$\mathbb{E}[\tilde{\mathbf{x}} | \mathbf{G}, \mathbf{C}, \varepsilon] = \mathbf{0}.$$

our derivation and identification result would hold regardless. What is key is that *either* the structural error term ε *or* the independent component of individual characteristics $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}$ is mean independent of the network structure (and the characteristics structure too). The plausibility of either hypothesis depends on the empirical application; in this paper we have maintained the former, rather than the latter, for ease of exposition. A further idea for future work is to examine which models of network formation – intended as restrictions on $\mathcal{F}(\cdot)$ – are consistent with these assumptions.

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Appendix – Mathematical Proofs

Proof of Theorem 1

We begin with a preliminary observation. We want to show that under the Theorem's condition (b), the matrix that characterizes the SARMA structure of the error:

$$\Psi_{AM}(\boldsymbol{\phi}, \boldsymbol{\psi}) \equiv (\mathbf{I} - \phi_1 \mathbf{F}_1 - \cdots - \phi_A \mathbf{F}_A)^{-1} (\mathbf{I} + \psi_1 \mathbf{E}_1 + \cdots + \phi_M \mathbf{E}_M),$$

and all its derivatives with respect to $(\boldsymbol{\phi}, \boldsymbol{\psi})$ are linearly independent. To this end, recall the following matrix defined in Assumption 5:

$$\Phi_A \equiv (\mathbf{I} - \phi_1 \mathbf{F}_1 - \cdots - \phi_A \mathbf{F}_A),$$

and write it as $\Phi_A(\boldsymbol{\phi})$. By the rules for the derivatives of inverted matrices, we can write, for $a = 1, \dots, A$:

$$\frac{\partial \Psi_{A,M}(\boldsymbol{\phi}, \boldsymbol{\psi})}{\partial \phi_a} = -\Phi_A^{-1}(\boldsymbol{\phi}) \cdot \mathbf{F}_a \cdot \Phi_A^{-1}(\boldsymbol{\phi}) \cdot (\mathbf{I} + \psi_1 \mathbf{E}_1 + \cdots + \phi_M \mathbf{E}_M),$$

and, for $m = 1, \dots, M$:

$$\frac{\partial \Psi_{A,M}(\boldsymbol{\phi}, \boldsymbol{\psi})}{\partial \psi_m} = \Phi_A^{-1}(\boldsymbol{\phi}) \cdot \mathbf{E}_m.$$

It is straightforward to see that under the hypotheses made in Assumption 5 about the \mathbf{F}_a and \mathbf{E}_m matrices, all the derivatives with respect to $\boldsymbol{\phi}$ are linearly independent of one another, and so are all the derivatives with respect to $\boldsymbol{\psi}$. In order to prove the desired result, it must be additionally verified that the matrices from these two sets are linearly independent of one another as well as of matrix $\Psi_{A,M}(\boldsymbol{\phi}, \boldsymbol{\psi})$ itself. This follows straightforwardly under condition (b) of the Theorem. This requirement must be verified on a case-by-case basis; however, the usual expansion for generalized Leontiev inverses, which converges so long as $\|\boldsymbol{\phi}\| < 1$ and that reads:

$$\Phi_A^{-1}(\boldsymbol{\phi}) = (\mathbf{I} - \phi_1 \mathbf{F}_1 - \cdots - \phi_A \mathbf{F}_A)^{-1} \simeq \sum_{s=1}^{\infty} (\phi_1 \mathbf{F}_1 + \cdots + \phi_A \mathbf{F}_A)^s,$$

can come to rescue in selected cases. To illustrate this, consider the relatively simple circumstance where $(A, M) = (1, 1)$ and $\mathbf{F}_1 = \mathbf{E}_1 = \mathbf{G}$. In this case, condition (b) requires that the adjacency matrix \mathbf{G} is linearly independent of $\sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \phi_1^s \mathbf{G}^{s+1} (\mathbf{I} + \psi_1 \mathbf{G})$ which is the usually the case for typical intransitive, sparse networks. Finally, observe that if matrix $\Psi_{A,M}(\boldsymbol{\phi}, \boldsymbol{\psi})$ as well as all its derivatives are linearly independent, so are their vectorized versions following the application of the $\text{vec}(\cdot)$ operator. In what follows, we thus use for convenience the vectorized versions.

We now move to our main identification proof. Let:

$$\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \equiv \mathbf{y} - \boldsymbol{\alpha}\boldsymbol{\iota} - \boldsymbol{\beta}\mathbf{G}\mathbf{y} - \mathbf{X}\boldsymbol{\gamma} - \mathbf{G}\mathbf{X}\boldsymbol{\delta},$$

and, for notational consistency, write the previous SARMA matrix $\boldsymbol{\Psi}_{A,M}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ as a function of $\boldsymbol{\theta}$. Consider the following set of moments:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}[\boldsymbol{\iota}^T \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}(\boldsymbol{\theta})] &= 0 \\ \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{x}_k^T \mathbf{G}^{q-1} \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}(\boldsymbol{\theta})] - \lambda_{1,qk}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) &= 0 \quad \text{for } q = 1, \dots, Q \text{ and } k = 1, \dots, K, \\ \mathbb{E}[\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \mathbf{P}^p \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}(\boldsymbol{\theta})] - \lambda_{2,p}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) &= 0 \quad \text{for } p = 1, \dots, P, \end{aligned}$$

where:

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda_{1,qk}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) &\equiv \sigma^2 \xi_k \text{Tr}(\mathbf{C}_k^T \mathbf{G}^{q-1} \cdot \boldsymbol{\Psi}_{A,M}(\boldsymbol{\theta})) \\ \lambda_{2,p}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) &\equiv \sigma^2 \text{Tr}(\boldsymbol{\Psi}_{A,M}^T(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \cdot \mathbf{P}^p \cdot \boldsymbol{\Psi}_{A,M}(\boldsymbol{\theta})). \end{aligned}$$

Consider these moments as stacked vertically in the vector $\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{m}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) - \boldsymbol{\lambda}(\boldsymbol{\theta})] = \mathbf{0}$ of length $1 + QK + P$. We evaluate a just-identified case with $Q = 4$ and $P = 1 + A + M$; to this end, partition the Jacobian matrix of the moments in four blocks, by splitting it horizontally after the first $1 + (Q - 1)K$ rows and vertically after the first $1 + QK$ columns:

$$\mathbf{H}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{H}_{11}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) & \mathbf{H}_{12}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \\ \mathbf{H}_{21}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) & \mathbf{H}_{22}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \end{bmatrix}.$$

We analyze each of these blocks in sequence.

The upper-left block is standard:

$$\mathbf{H}_{11}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) = -\mathbb{E} \begin{bmatrix} N & \boldsymbol{\iota}^T \mathbf{G}\mathbf{y} & \boldsymbol{\iota}^T \mathbf{X} & \boldsymbol{\iota}^T \mathbf{G}\mathbf{X} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ \mathbf{x}_k^T \mathbf{G}^{q-1} \boldsymbol{\iota} & \mathbf{x}_k^T \mathbf{G}^q \mathbf{y} & \mathbf{x}_k^T \mathbf{G}^{q-1} \mathbf{X} & \mathbf{x}_k^T \mathbf{G}^q \mathbf{X} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \end{bmatrix},$$

for $k = 1, \dots, K$ and $q = 1, \dots, Q$. This block has full column and full row ranks if the data (\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{y}) are not collinear and the four matrices \mathbf{I} , \mathbf{G} , \mathbf{G}^2 and \mathbf{G}^3 are linearly independent. The lower-left block is also quite regular; for $p = 1, \dots, P$:

$$\mathbf{H}_{21}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) = -2 \cdot \mathbb{E} \begin{bmatrix} \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^T(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \mathbf{P}^p \boldsymbol{\iota} & \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^T(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \mathbf{P}^p \mathbf{G}\mathbf{y} & \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^T(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \mathbf{P}^p \mathbf{X} & \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^T(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \mathbf{P}^p \mathbf{G}\mathbf{X} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \end{bmatrix},$$

which also has full row and column rank when the data are not collinear and the \mathbf{P}^p matrices are linearly independent (condition (a) in the text). Note that for a given $\boldsymbol{\theta}$, in this case the rows of the upper-left block $\mathbf{H}_{11}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ are also linearly independent of

those in the lower-left block $\mathbf{H}_{21}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$, as standard when linear moments are juxtaposed to second order moments.

The upper-right block compares with the last column of the Jacobian matrix from Proposition 3:

$$\mathbf{H}_{12}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{0}^T & \mathbf{0}^T & \mathbf{0}^T & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ \frac{\partial \lambda_{1,qk}(\boldsymbol{\theta})}{\partial \boldsymbol{\xi}^T} & \frac{\partial \lambda_{1,qk}(\boldsymbol{\theta})}{\partial \boldsymbol{\phi}^T} & \frac{\partial \lambda_{1,qk}(\boldsymbol{\theta})}{\partial \boldsymbol{\psi}^T} & \frac{\partial \lambda_{1,qk}(\boldsymbol{\theta})}{\partial \sigma^2} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \end{bmatrix},$$

for $k = 1, \dots, K$ and $q = 1, \dots, Q$; the derivatives in each row are as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \lambda_{1,qk}(\boldsymbol{\theta})}{\xi_{k'}} &= \sigma^2 \text{vec}(\mathbf{C}_k^T)^T (\mathbf{I} \otimes \mathbf{G}^{q-1}) \text{vec}(\boldsymbol{\Psi}_{A,M}(\boldsymbol{\theta})) \cdot \mathbb{1}[k = k'] \quad \text{for } k' = 1, \dots, K, \\ \frac{\partial \lambda_{1,qk}(\boldsymbol{\theta})}{\phi_a} &= \sigma^2 \xi_k \text{vec}(\mathbf{C}_k^T)^T (\mathbf{I} \otimes \mathbf{G}^{q-1}) \text{vec}\left(\frac{\partial \boldsymbol{\Psi}_{A,M}(\boldsymbol{\theta})}{\partial \phi_a}\right) \quad \text{for } a = 1, \dots, A, \\ \frac{\partial \lambda_{1,qk}(\boldsymbol{\theta})}{\psi_m} &= \sigma^2 \xi_k \text{vec}(\mathbf{C}_k^T)^T (\mathbf{I} \otimes \mathbf{G}^{q-1}) \text{vec}\left(\frac{\partial \boldsymbol{\Psi}_{A,M}(\boldsymbol{\theta})}{\partial \psi_m}\right) \quad \text{for } m = 1, \dots, M, \\ \frac{\partial \lambda_{1,qk}(\boldsymbol{\theta})}{\sigma^2} &= \xi_k \text{vec}(\mathbf{C}_k^T)^T (\mathbf{I} \otimes \mathbf{G}^{q-1}) \text{vec}(\boldsymbol{\Psi}_{A,M}(\boldsymbol{\theta})). \end{aligned}$$

Notice that some rows of $\mathbf{H}_{12}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ might be linearly dependent if any pair of matrices \mathbf{C}_k coincide, but this does not affect our main argument. In fact, we focus on column rank for the two right blocks as it relates with the identification of the $(\boldsymbol{\xi}, \boldsymbol{\phi}, \boldsymbol{\psi}, \sigma^2)$ parameters. Thus, it is helpful to consider the lower-right block as well:

$$\mathbf{H}_{22}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) = \begin{bmatrix} \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ \mathbf{0}^T & \frac{\partial \lambda_{2,p}(\boldsymbol{\theta})}{\partial \boldsymbol{\phi}^T} & \frac{\partial \lambda_{2,p}(\boldsymbol{\theta})}{\partial \boldsymbol{\psi}^T} & \frac{\partial \lambda_{2,p}(\boldsymbol{\theta})}{\partial \sigma^2} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \end{bmatrix},$$

for $p = 1, \dots, P$, with the following derivatives:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \lambda_{2,p}(\boldsymbol{\theta})}{\phi_a} &= 2\sigma^2 \text{vec}(\boldsymbol{\Psi}_{A,M}^T(\boldsymbol{\theta}))^T (\mathbf{I} \otimes \mathbf{P}^p) \text{vec}\left(\frac{\partial \boldsymbol{\Psi}_{A,M}(\boldsymbol{\theta})}{\partial \phi_a}\right) \quad \text{for } a = 1, \dots, A, \\ \frac{\partial \lambda_{2,p}(\boldsymbol{\theta})}{\psi_m} &= 2\sigma^2 \text{vec}(\boldsymbol{\Psi}_{A,M}^T(\boldsymbol{\theta}))^T (\mathbf{I} \otimes \mathbf{P}^p) \text{vec}\left(\frac{\partial \boldsymbol{\Psi}_{A,M}(\boldsymbol{\theta})}{\partial \psi_m}\right) \quad \text{for } m = 1, \dots, M, \\ \frac{\partial \lambda_{2,p}(\boldsymbol{\theta})}{\sigma^2} &= \text{vec}(\boldsymbol{\Psi}_{A,M}^T(\boldsymbol{\theta}))^T (\mathbf{I} \otimes \mathbf{P}^p) \text{vec}(\boldsymbol{\Psi}_{A,M}(\boldsymbol{\theta})). \end{aligned}$$

Observe how the submatrix of $\mathbf{H}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ formed by the two blocks $\mathbf{H}_{12}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ and $\mathbf{H}_{22}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ has full column rank. In fact, the previous observation about matrix $\boldsymbol{\Psi}_{A,M}(\boldsymbol{\phi}, \boldsymbol{\psi})$ implies

that its vectorized version and that of its derivatives with respect to $\boldsymbol{\phi}$ and $\boldsymbol{\psi}$ are all linearly independent; in addition, the linear independence of all the columns that contain the derivatives of $\lambda_{1,qk}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ and $\lambda_{2,p}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ with respect to $\boldsymbol{\xi}$ and σ^2 is guaranteed by the sparsity structure of the first K columns of both blocks. The only case where full column rank would fail is when any of the first K columns of $\mathbf{H}_{12}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$, those that contain the derivatives of $\lambda_{1,qk}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ with respect to $\boldsymbol{\xi}$, features all zeros. However, this possibility is ruled out by condition (c) in the statement of Theorem. Like its analog for Proposition 3 this is a moot requirement, as its violation would imply that there is no meaningful endogeneity for some covariates of interest.

It remains to show that the the entire Jacobian $\mathbf{H}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ is overall nonsingular. Full row rank is guaranteed by the previous observation that the rows of the left blocks of $\mathbf{H}_{11}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ and $\mathbf{H}_{21}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ are linearly independent. Full column rank instead might fail if any of the columns of the upper-right block $\mathbf{H}_{12}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$, which contain the derivatives of $\lambda_{1,qk}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ with respect to $\boldsymbol{\xi}$, is collinear with some other column of the corresponding upper-left block $\mathbf{H}_{11}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$. This is generally a strong requirement: to illustrate, suppose that $\boldsymbol{\Psi}_{A,M}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) = \mathbf{I}$; in analogy with Proposition 3, full column rank fails if, for some k' , vector $\text{vec}(\mathbf{C}_{k'})$ is perfectly collinear with any of $\text{vec}(\boldsymbol{\iota}\mathbf{x}_{k'}^T)$, $\text{vec}(\mathbf{x}_k\mathbf{x}_{k'}^T)$, $\text{vec}(\mathbf{x}_k\mathbf{G}\mathbf{x}_{k'}^T)$, $\text{vec}(\mathbf{G}\mathbf{y}\mathbf{x}_{k'}^T)$, for $k = 1, \dots, K$. In words, some characteristic matrix \mathbf{C}_k must perfectly predict a specific configuration of some subset of the data. However, the variation of each of the covariates \mathbf{x}_k (and thus ultimately of the outcome \mathbf{y}) is largely determined by the independent component $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_k$, which takes values on a continuous support. Since all the characteristic matrices are non-stochastic, it follows that such an instance of perfect multicollinearity has probability zero. Hence, the Jacobian matrix $\mathbf{H}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ is almost surely invertible and the parameter set $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ is almost always identified.

Proof of Theorem 2

In this proof, we denote by $\mathbf{x}_{k,N}^*$ the k -th column of \mathbf{X}_N for $k = 1, \dots, K$; its expected value $\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{x}_{k,N}] = \mathbb{E}[\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_{k,N}^*]$, where $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}_{k,N}$ is defined in Assumption 6, corresponds with the k -th column of $\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{X}_N]$. We also write the unconditional expected value of \mathbf{y}_N as:

$$\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{y}_N] = (\mathbf{I}_N - \beta_0\mathbf{G}_N)^{-1}(\alpha_0\boldsymbol{\iota}_N + \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{X}_N]\boldsymbol{\gamma}_0 + \mathbf{G}_N\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{X}_N]\boldsymbol{\delta}_0).$$

We also introduce some additional auxiliary notation. For a start, the matrix:

$$\tilde{\mathbf{G}}_N(\beta) \equiv \mathbf{G}_N(\mathbf{I}_N - \beta\mathbf{G}_N)^{-1},$$

helps further define the following vectors:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{d}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta}) &\equiv (\alpha_0 - \alpha)\boldsymbol{\iota}_N + (\beta_0 - \beta)\mathbf{G}_N\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{y}_N] + \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{X}_N](\boldsymbol{\gamma}_0 - \boldsymbol{\gamma}) + \mathbf{G}_N\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{X}_N](\boldsymbol{\delta}_0 - \boldsymbol{\delta}), \\ \mathbf{e}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta}) &\equiv \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_N + (\mathbf{X}_N - \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{X}_N])(\boldsymbol{\gamma}_0 - \boldsymbol{\gamma}) + \mathbf{G}_N(\mathbf{X}_N - \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{X}_N])(\boldsymbol{\delta}_0 - \boldsymbol{\delta}) \\ &\quad + (\beta_0 - \beta)\tilde{\mathbf{G}}_N(\beta_0)[\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_N + (\mathbf{X}_N - \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{X}_N])\boldsymbol{\gamma}_0 + \mathbf{G}_N(\mathbf{X}_N - \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{X}_N])\boldsymbol{\delta}_0]. \end{aligned}$$

Note that $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta}) = \mathbf{d}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta}) + \mathbf{e}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta})$. In addition, the following K matrices will be helpful throughout:

$$\boldsymbol{\Gamma}_{k,0}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \equiv \left[(\gamma_{k,0} - \gamma_k) \mathbf{I}_N + (\delta_{k,0} - \delta_k) \mathbf{G}_N + (\beta_0 - \beta) \tilde{\mathbf{G}}_N(\beta_0) (\gamma_{k,0} \mathbf{I}_N + \delta_{k,0} \mathbf{G}_N) \right],$$

where $k = 1, \dots, K$. Finally, observe that the GMM weighting matrix \mathbf{W}_N can be written as:

$$\mathbf{W}_N = \mathbf{A}_N^T \mathbf{A}_N,$$

where \mathbf{A}_N is a square matrix of dimension $1 + QK + P$ and such that $\mathbf{A}_N \xrightarrow{p} \mathbf{A}_0$ and $\text{rank}(\mathbf{A}_N) \geq \dim|\boldsymbol{\theta}|$, where $\mathbf{A}_0^T \mathbf{A}_0 = \mathbf{W}_0$. This implies that the vector $\mathbf{A}_N \mathbf{m}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ can be decomposed as:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{N} \mathbf{A}_N \mathbf{m}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta}) &= \frac{1}{N} a_{1,N} \mathbf{1}_N^T + \frac{1}{N} \left[\sum_{q=1}^Q \sum_{k=1}^K a_{1+(q-1)K+k,N} \mathbf{q}_{qk,N} \right. \\ &\quad \left. + \sum_{p=1}^P a_{1+QK+p,N} \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_N^T(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \mathbf{P}_{p,N} \right] \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta}), \end{aligned} \quad (\text{A.1})$$

where the $1 + QK + P$ elements written as $a_{.,N}$ are appropriate combinations of the elements of \mathbf{A}_N . Our main proof of consistency is based on this decomposition; later we refer to the “first” and the “second” element of (A.1) as the two summations laid out within brackets respectively in the first and second line of the above display.

Before we get to the proof proper, one final preparatory step is useful. We later further decompose the elements of (A.1) into smaller bits, through some auxiliary vectors and matrices; it is helpful to introduce these arrays immediately. They are: (i) some $K(1 + K)$ matrices, which are written as $\mathbf{R}_{k,N}^*(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ and $\mathbf{R}_{kk',N}^*(\boldsymbol{\theta})$, and are indexed by $k, k' = 1, \dots, K$:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{R}_{k,N}^*(\boldsymbol{\theta}) &\equiv \sum_{q=1}^Q \mathbf{G}_N^{q-1} a_{1+qk,N} \left[\mathbf{I}_N + (\beta_0 - \beta) \tilde{\mathbf{G}}_N(\beta_0) \right] \\ \mathbf{R}_{kk',N}^*(\boldsymbol{\theta}) &\equiv \sum_{q=1}^Q \mathbf{G}_N^{q-1} a_{1+qk,N} \boldsymbol{\Gamma}_{k,0}(\boldsymbol{\theta}), \end{aligned}$$

(ii) a set of $K + 1$ vectors written as $\mathbf{l}_{0,N}^{**}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ and as $\mathbf{l}_{k,N}^{**}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ for $k = 1, \dots, K$;

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{l}_{0,N}^{**}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) &\equiv \mathbf{d}_N^T(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \sum_{p=1}^P a_{1+QK+p,N} \mathbf{P}_{p,N} \left[\mathbf{I}_N + (\beta_0 - \beta) \tilde{\mathbf{G}}_N(\beta_0) \right] \\ \mathbf{l}_{k,N}^{**}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) &\equiv \mathbf{d}_N^T(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \sum_{p=1}^P a_{1+QK+p,N} \mathbf{P}_{p,N} \boldsymbol{\Gamma}_{k,0}(\boldsymbol{\theta}), \end{aligned}$$

(iii) another set of $1 + K + K^2$ matrices, written as $\mathbf{R}_{0,N}^{**}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$, $\mathbf{R}_{k,N}^{**}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ and $\mathbf{R}_{kk',N}^{**}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$, and indexed by $k, k' = 1, \dots, K$:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{R}_{0,N}^{**}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) &\equiv \left(\mathbf{I}_N + (\beta_0 - \beta) \tilde{\mathbf{G}}_N^T(\beta_0) \right) \sum_{p=1}^P a_{1+QK+p,N} \mathbf{P}_{p,N} \left(\mathbf{I}_N + (\beta_0 - \beta) \tilde{\mathbf{G}}_N(\beta_0) \right) \\ \mathbf{R}_{k,N}^{**}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) &\equiv \left(\mathbf{I}_N + (\beta_0 - \beta) \tilde{\mathbf{G}}_N^T(\beta_0) \right) \sum_{p=1}^P a_{1+QK+p,N} \left(\mathbf{P}_{p,N} + \mathbf{P}_{p,N}^T \right) \boldsymbol{\Gamma}_{k,0}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \\ \mathbf{R}_{kk',N}^{**}(\boldsymbol{\theta}) &\equiv \boldsymbol{\Gamma}_{k',0}^T(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \left[\sum_{p=1}^P a_{1+QK+p,N} \mathbf{P}_{p,N} \right] \boldsymbol{\Gamma}_{k,0}(\boldsymbol{\theta}).\end{aligned}$$

We now proceed to our main argument. In order to establish consistency of $\hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{GMM}$, it is necessary to show uniform convergence in probability for all the elements that comprise the vector $\mathbf{A}_N \mathbf{m}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta})$. Consider the first element in brackets in (A.1):

$$\begin{aligned}\sum_{q=1}^Q \sum_{k=1}^K a_{1+(q-1)K+k,N} \mathbf{q}_{qk,N} \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta}) &= \underbrace{\sum_{q=1}^Q \sum_{k=1}^K a_{1+(q-1)K+k,N} \left(\mathbf{G}_N^{q-1} \mathbf{x}_{k,N}^* \right)^T \mathbf{d}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta})}_{\equiv l_N^*(\boldsymbol{\theta})} \\ &\quad + \underbrace{\sum_{q=1}^Q \sum_{k=1}^K a_{1+(q-1)K+q,N} \left(\mathbf{G}_N^{q-1} \mathbf{x}_{k,N}^* \right)^T \mathbf{e}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta})}_{\equiv r_N^*(\boldsymbol{\theta})},\end{aligned}$$

where $l_N^*(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ is given by:

$$\frac{1}{N} l_N^*(\boldsymbol{\theta}) = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{q=1}^Q \sum_{k=1}^K a_{1+(q-1)K+k,N} \left(\mathbf{G}_N^{q-1} \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{x}_{k,N}^*] \right)^T \mathbf{d}_N^T(\boldsymbol{\theta}) + o_P(1),$$

while $r_N^*(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ can be expressed as a function of the $\mathbf{R}_{k,N}^*(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ and $\mathbf{R}_{kk',N}^*(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ matrices defined above (note: the second line continues on the next page):

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{1}{N} r_N^*(\boldsymbol{\theta}) &= \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^K \left(\mathbf{x}_{k,N}^* - \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{x}_{k,N}^*] \right)^T \mathbf{R}_{k,N}^*(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \left(\mathbf{x}_{k,N}^* - \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{x}_{k,N}^*] \right) \\ &\quad + \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^K \sum_{k'=1}^K \left(\mathbf{x}_{k',N}^* - \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{x}_{k',N}^*] \right)^T \mathbf{R}_{k,k',N}^*(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_N \\ &= \sigma_0^2 \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^K \xi_{0,k} \text{Tr} \left(\mathbf{C}_{k,N}^T \mathbf{R}_{k,N}^*(\boldsymbol{\theta}) (\mathbf{I}_N + \psi_0 \mathbf{E}_N) \right)\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& + \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^K \sum_{k'=1}^K \xi_{0,k} \xi_{0,k'} \text{Tr} \left(\mathbf{C}_{k,N}^T \mathbf{R}_{k,k',N}^* (\boldsymbol{\theta}) \mathbf{C}_{k,N} \right) \\
& + \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^K \sum_{k'=1}^K \Xi_{kk'} \cdot \text{Tr} \left(\mathbf{R}_{k,k',N}^* (\boldsymbol{\theta}) \right) + o_P(1).
\end{aligned}$$

Similarly, the second term in brackets in (A.1) can be decomposed as:

$$\begin{aligned}
\sum_{p=1}^P a_{1+QK+p,N} \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_N^T (\boldsymbol{\theta}) \mathbf{P}_{p,N} \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_N (\boldsymbol{\theta}) &= \sum_{p=1}^P a_{1+QK+p,N} \mathbf{d}_N^T (\boldsymbol{\theta}) \mathbf{P}_{p,N} \mathbf{d}_N (\boldsymbol{\theta}) \\
&+ 2 \underbrace{\sum_{p=1}^P a_{1+QK+p,N} \mathbf{d}_N^T (\boldsymbol{\theta}) \mathbf{P}_{p,N} \mathbf{e}_N (\boldsymbol{\theta})}_{\equiv l_N^{**} (\boldsymbol{\theta})} + \underbrace{\sum_{p=1}^P a_{1+QK+p,N} \mathbf{e}_N^T (\boldsymbol{\theta}) \mathbf{P}_{p,N} \mathbf{e}_N (\boldsymbol{\theta})}_{\equiv r_N^{**} (\boldsymbol{\theta})},
\end{aligned}$$

where $l_N^{**} (\boldsymbol{\theta})$ is written in terms of $\mathbf{l}_{0,N}^{**} (\boldsymbol{\theta})$ and $\mathbf{l}_{k,N}^{**} (\boldsymbol{\theta})$:

$$\frac{1}{N} l_N^{**} (\boldsymbol{\theta}) = \frac{1}{N} \mathbf{l}_{0,N} (\boldsymbol{\theta}) \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_N + \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^K \mathbf{l}_{k,N} (\boldsymbol{\theta}) (\mathbf{x}_{k,N}^* - \mathbb{E} [\mathbf{x}_{k,N}^*]) = o_P(1),$$

while the term $r_N^{**} (\boldsymbol{\theta})$ can be related to $\mathbf{R}_{0,N}^{**} (\boldsymbol{\theta})$, $\mathbf{R}_{k,N}^{**} (\boldsymbol{\theta})$ and $\mathbf{R}_{k,k',N}^{**} (\boldsymbol{\theta})$:

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{1}{N} r_N^{**} (\boldsymbol{\theta}) &= \frac{1}{N} \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_N^T \mathbf{R}_{0,N}^{**} (\boldsymbol{\theta}) \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_N + \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^K \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_N^T \mathbf{R}_{k,N}^{**} (\boldsymbol{\theta}) (\mathbf{x}_{k,N}^* - \mathbb{E} [\mathbf{x}_{k,N}^*]) \\
&+ \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k'=1}^K (\mathbf{x}_{k',N}^* - \mathbb{E} [\mathbf{x}_{k',N}^*])^T \mathbf{R}_{k,k',N}^{**} (\boldsymbol{\theta}) (\mathbf{x}_{k,N}^* - \mathbb{E} [\mathbf{x}_{k,N}^*]) \\
&= \sigma_0^2 \frac{1}{N} \text{Tr} \left((\mathbf{I}_N + \boldsymbol{\psi}_0 \mathbf{E}_N)^T \mathbf{R}_{0,N}^{**} (\boldsymbol{\theta}) (\mathbf{I}_N + \boldsymbol{\psi}_0 \mathbf{E}_N) \right) \\
&+ \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^K \sigma_0^2 \xi_{0,k} \text{Tr} \left((\mathbf{I}_N + \boldsymbol{\psi}_0 \mathbf{E}_N)^T \mathbf{R}_{k,N}^{**} (\boldsymbol{\theta}) \mathbf{C}_{k,N} \right) \\
&+ \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^K \sum_{k'=1}^K \sigma_0^2 \xi_{0,k} \xi_{0,k'} \text{Tr} \left(\mathbf{C}_{k,N}^T \mathbf{R}_{k,k',N}^{**} (\boldsymbol{\theta}) \mathbf{C}_{k,N} \right) \\
&+ \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^K \sum_{k'=1}^K \Xi_{kk'} \cdot \text{Tr} \left(\mathbf{R}_{k,k',N}^{**} (\boldsymbol{\theta}) \right) + o_P(1).
\end{aligned}$$

Note that $N^{-1} \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_N^T \{ \mathbf{x}_{k,N}^* - \mathbb{E} [\mathbf{x}_{k,N}^*] \} = o_P(1)$ for $k = 1, \dots, K$ uniformly in $\boldsymbol{\theta} \in \Theta$ by Lemmas A.3 and A.4 in Lee (2007a). Since Θ is bounded and all the terms $l_N^{**} (\boldsymbol{\theta})$,

$r_N^*(\boldsymbol{\theta})$, $l_N^{**}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ and $r_N^{**}(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ can be expressed as appropriate functions of the relevant parameters, uniform convergence follows. Since $\mathbf{m}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ is also quadratic in $\boldsymbol{\theta}$ and Θ is bounded, then $\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{m}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta})]$ is uniformly equicontinuous in Θ . This result, along with the identification conditions, implies that the identification uniqueness condition for $\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{m}_N^T(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \mathbf{A}_N^T \mathbf{A}_N \mathbf{m}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta})]$ is satisfied. Thus, the consistency of the GMM estimator follows from standard arguments (White, 1996).

It remains to show that $\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{GMM}$ is also asymptotically normal. The usual application of the Mean Value Theorem to the First Order Conditions of the GMM problem gives:

$$\sqrt{N} \left(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{GMM} - \boldsymbol{\theta}_0 \right) = - \left[\mathbf{J}_N^T \left(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{GMM} \right) \mathbf{W}_N \mathbf{J}_N \left(\bar{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \right) \right]^{-1} \mathbf{J}_N^T \left(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{GMM} \right) \mathbf{W}_N \sqrt{N} \mathbf{m}_N \left(\boldsymbol{\theta}_0 \right).$$

where $\mathbf{J}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta}) = \frac{\partial}{\partial \boldsymbol{\theta}} \mathbf{m}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta})$. By Theorem 1 in Kelejian and Prucha (2001):

$$\sqrt{N} \mathbf{A}_N \mathbf{m}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta}_0) \xrightarrow{d} \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{A}_0 \boldsymbol{\Omega}_0 \mathbf{A}_0^T). \quad (\text{A.2})$$

Hence, the main result would follow if $\mathbf{J}_N \left(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{GMM} \right) = \mathbf{J}_0 + o_P(1)$. Note that:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{J}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta}) = & -\frac{1}{N} \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{Q}_{1,N} \\ \vdots \\ \mathbf{Q}_{Q,N} \\ 2\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_N^T(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \mathbf{P}_{1,N} \\ \vdots \\ 2\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_N^T(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \mathbf{P}_{P,N} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{\iota}_N & \mathbf{G}_N \mathbf{y}_N & \mathbf{X}_N & \mathbf{G}_N \mathbf{X}_N & \mathbf{0}_N & \mathbf{0}_N & \mathbf{0}_N \end{bmatrix} \\ & + \frac{1}{N} \frac{\partial \boldsymbol{\lambda}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta})}{\partial \boldsymbol{\theta}^T}, \end{aligned}$$

where $\mathbf{0}_N$ is shorthand for an N -dimensional vector of zeros. Leaving $\frac{\partial}{\partial \boldsymbol{\theta}^T} \boldsymbol{\lambda}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ aside for the moment, we focus on a submatrix of the first term on the right-hand side, that is the last P rows of the second column. This vector comprises the derivatives of the P second-order moments with respect to $\boldsymbol{\beta}$; the analysis of the rest of the matrix is just a simpler case. By Lemmas A.3 and A.4 in Lee (2007a), one can write every p -th element of said subvector, for $p = 1, 2, \dots, P$, as:

$$\frac{1}{N} \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_N^T(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \mathbf{P}_{p,N} \widetilde{\mathbf{G}}_N(\boldsymbol{\beta}_0) (\boldsymbol{\alpha}_0 \boldsymbol{\iota} + \mathbf{X}_N \boldsymbol{\gamma}_0 + \mathbf{G}_N \mathbf{X}_N \boldsymbol{\delta}_0 + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_N) = b_{p,N} + v_{p,N} + t_{p,N} + f_{p,N},$$

where $\mathbf{y}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta}_0) \equiv (\mathbf{I}_N - \boldsymbol{\beta}_0 \mathbf{G}_N)^{-1} (\boldsymbol{\alpha}_0 \boldsymbol{\iota}_N + \mathbf{X}_N \boldsymbol{\gamma}_0 + \mathbf{G}_N \mathbf{X}_N \boldsymbol{\delta}_0 + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_N)$. The terms on the right-hand side are instead given by:

$$b_{p,N} = \frac{1}{N} \mathbf{d}_N^T(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \mathbf{P}_{p,N} \mathbf{G}_N \mathbf{y}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta}_0) = \frac{1}{N} \mathbf{d}_N^T(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \mathbf{P}_{p,N} \mathbf{G}_N \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{y}_N] + o_P(1),$$

and:

$$v_{p,N} = \frac{1}{N} \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_N^T \mathbf{P}_{p,N} \mathbf{G}_N \mathbf{y}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta}_0) = \sigma_0^2 \frac{1}{N} \text{Tr} \left[\mathbf{P}_{p,N} \tilde{\mathbf{G}}_N(\boldsymbol{\beta}_0) \right] \\ + \sum_{k=1}^K \frac{1}{N} \sigma_0^2 \text{Tr} \left[(\mathbf{I}_N + \boldsymbol{\psi}_0 \mathbf{E}_N)^T \mathbf{P}_{p,N} \tilde{\mathbf{G}}_N(\boldsymbol{\beta}_0) (\gamma_{k,0} \mathbf{C}_{k,N} + \delta_{k,0} \mathbf{G}_N \mathbf{C}_{k,N}) \boldsymbol{\xi}_{k,0} \right] + o_P(1),$$

and:

$$t_{p,N} = \frac{1}{N} (\boldsymbol{\beta}_0 - \boldsymbol{\beta}) \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_N^T \tilde{\mathbf{G}}_N(\boldsymbol{\beta}_0)^T \mathbf{P}_{p,N} \mathbf{G}_N \mathbf{y}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta}_0) \\ = \sigma_0^2 (\boldsymbol{\beta}_0 - \boldsymbol{\beta}) \frac{1}{N} \left\{ \text{Tr} \left(\tilde{\mathbf{G}}_N^T(\boldsymbol{\beta}_0) \mathbf{P}_{p,N} \tilde{\mathbf{G}}_N(\boldsymbol{\beta}_0) \right) + \sum_{k=1}^K \text{Tr} \left[(\mathbf{I}_N + \boldsymbol{\psi}_0 \mathbf{E}_N)^T \right. \right. \\ \left. \left. \cdot \tilde{\mathbf{G}}_N^T(\boldsymbol{\beta}_0) \mathbf{P}_{p,N} \tilde{\mathbf{G}}_N(\boldsymbol{\beta}_0) (\gamma_{k,0} \mathbf{C}_{k,N} + \delta_{k,0} \mathbf{G}_N \mathbf{C}_{k,N}) \boldsymbol{\xi}_{k,0} \right] \right\} + o_P(1),$$

and:

$$f_{p,N} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^K (\mathbf{x}_{k',N}^* - \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{x}_{k',N}^*])^T \boldsymbol{\Gamma}_{k,0}^T(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \mathbf{P}_{p,N} \mathbf{G}_N \mathbf{y}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta}_0) \\ = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^K \boldsymbol{\xi}_{k,0} \mathbf{C}_{k,N}^T \boldsymbol{\Gamma}_{k,0}^T(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \mathbf{P}_{p,N} \tilde{\mathbf{G}}_N(\boldsymbol{\beta}_0) \left(\mathbf{I}_N \sigma_0^2 + \sum_{k'=1}^K (\gamma_{k',0} \mathbf{I}_N + \delta_{k',0} \mathbf{G}_N) \mathbf{C}_{k,N} \right) \\ + \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^K \sum_{k'=1}^K \Xi_{kk'} \cdot \mathbf{P}_{p,N} \tilde{\mathbf{G}}_N(\boldsymbol{\beta}_0) (\gamma_{k',0} \mathbf{I}_N + \delta_{k',0} \mathbf{G}_N) + o_P(1).$$

All the probability limits above imply uniform convergence for any $\boldsymbol{\theta} \in \boldsymbol{\Theta}$. Evaluating these terms at $\boldsymbol{\theta} = \boldsymbol{\theta}_0$, implies $d_{p,N} = v_{p,N} = t_{p,N} = f_{p,N} = o_P(1)$ as $\mathbf{d}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta}_0) = \mathbf{0}$. Collecting these results together gives:

$$\frac{1}{N} \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^T(\boldsymbol{\theta}) \mathbf{P}_{p,N} \mathbf{G}_N \mathbf{y}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta}_0) = \sigma_0^2 \text{Tr} \left[\mathbf{P}_{p,N} \tilde{\mathbf{G}}_N(\boldsymbol{\beta}_0) \right] \\ + \sigma_0^2 \sum_{k=1}^K \boldsymbol{\xi}_{k,0} \text{Tr} \left[(\mathbf{I}_N + \boldsymbol{\psi}_0 \mathbf{E}_N)^T \mathbf{P}_{p,N} \tilde{\mathbf{G}}_N(\boldsymbol{\beta}_0) \mathbf{G}_N \right] + o_P(1).$$

Furthermore, some tedious analysis reveals that $\frac{1}{N} \frac{\partial}{\partial \boldsymbol{\theta}^T} \boldsymbol{\lambda}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta}) = \frac{1}{N} \frac{\partial}{\partial \boldsymbol{\theta}^T} \boldsymbol{\lambda}(\boldsymbol{\theta}_0) + o_P(1)$; hence, the $P \times 1$ submatrix of $\mathbf{J}_N(\boldsymbol{\theta})$ under examination has the desired properties. Finally, consistency of $\hat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{GMM}$ also straightforwardly implies that $\mathbf{J}_N(\bar{\boldsymbol{\theta}}) \xrightarrow{p} \mathbf{J}_0$. These considerations, together with equation A.2, yield the desired result through the usual application of Slutsky's theorem.

Addendum: Bias of Conventional Methods, Analysis

This section elaborates the analysis of the bias entailed by conventional methods for the estimation of social effects – specifically Bramoullé et al. (2009, henceforth BDF) – as anticipated in footnote 8 of the main text. First, recall that under an exogeneity assumption about the matrix of covariates \mathbf{X} , BDF proposed a consistent estimator which employs the spatial lags of the covariates themselves as instruments. To better understand the source of endogeneity in the model presented in this paper, it is useful to examine the source of endogeneity for OLS under the exogeneity assumption in BDF. Recall the SAR model (6), written without N subscripts:

$$\mathbf{y} = \alpha\mathbf{1} + \beta\mathbf{G}\mathbf{y} + \gamma\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon},$$

and note that under homoscedasticity, OLS is based on the following moments:

$$\mathbb{E} [\mathbf{1}^T \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}] = 0 \tag{A.3}$$

$$\mathbb{E} [(\mathbf{G}\mathbf{y})^T \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}] = \sigma_0^2 \text{Tr} ((\mathbf{I} - \beta\mathbf{G})^{-1} \mathbf{G}^T) \tag{A.4}$$

$$\mathbb{E} [\mathbf{x}^T \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}] = 0, \tag{A.5}$$

where (A.4) is better understood by noting that:

$$\mathbb{E} [(\mathbf{G}\mathbf{y})^T \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}] = \mathbb{E} [\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}^T (\mathbf{I} - \beta\mathbf{G})^{-1} \mathbf{G}^T \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}].$$

The bias arising from endogeneity is proportional to the right-hand side of (A.4). Since $\mathbf{G}\mathbf{y}$ linearly depends on $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}$, this moment is non-zero in expectation, and therefore OLS is inconsistent. This is circumvented by substituting it by the moment:

$$\mathbb{E} [(\mathbf{G}^q \mathbf{y})^T \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}] = 0$$

for some positive integer q . This moment equals zero in expectation and is therefore valid so long as the adjacency matrix \mathbf{G} satisfies the conditions spelled out by BDF (i.e. \mathbf{I} , \mathbf{G} and \mathbf{G}^2 need to be linearly independent).

The model we consider generalizes that by BDF by making \mathbf{x} and $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}$ correlated. Consider for simplicity the case with only one individual covariate ($K = 1$) as well as a SARMA(0,1) specification. For some positive integer q , our key moments are given by the equations:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E} [(\mathbf{G}\mathbf{y})^T \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}] &= \mathbb{E} [(\gamma\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon})^T (\mathbf{I} - \beta\mathbf{G})^{-1} \mathbf{G}\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}] \\ &= \gamma\xi\sigma^2 \text{Tr} (\mathbf{C}^T (\mathbf{I} - \beta\mathbf{G})^{-1} \mathbf{G}^T (\mathbf{I} + \psi\mathbf{E})) \\ &\quad + \sigma^2 \text{Tr} ((\mathbf{I} - \beta\mathbf{G})^{-1} \mathbf{G}^T), \end{aligned} \tag{A.6}$$

and:

$$\mathbb{E} \left[(\mathbf{G}^q \mathbf{x})^T \boldsymbol{\varepsilon} \right] = \xi \sigma^2 \text{Tr} \left((\mathbf{G}^q \mathbf{C})^T (\mathbf{I} + \psi \mathbf{E}) \right). \quad (\text{A.7})$$

When the model features endogeneity ($\xi \neq 0$), both moments (A.6) and (A.7) are non-zero in expectation. Observe that (A.6) is composed of two terms: one that encodes the endogeneity of $\mathbf{G}\mathbf{y}$ relative to $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}$, and one that captures the endogeneity between \mathbf{x} and $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}$. On the other hand, the bias in (A.7) is entirely due to the endogeneity of \mathbf{x} . The bias depends crucially on the interaction between the network adjacency matrix \mathbf{G} and the characteristics matrix \mathbf{C} , which determines the spatial correlation of the different variables at hand. Note also that the spatial MA(1) term of $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}$, expressed by the term $\psi \mathbf{E}$, amplifies the diffusion across individuals, but it does not cause a bias to the BDF moments so long as the individual characteristics are exogenous ($\xi = 0$).