Observable Worker and Firm Sources of Wage Inequality
Joint work with Aslan Bakirov and Francesco Del Prato. Under review.
Abstract. How much wage dispersion is visible in characteristics we observe? Using Portuguese matched employer-employee records linked to firm financial data, we sort workers and firms into observable cells and decompose log wages across worker-firm cells. Worker cells account for 35.0% of the variance, firm cells 6.7%, sorting 8.8%, and a worker-firm interaction 6.7%; the remaining 42.8% lies within cells. A second exercise splits the firm component into what firms pay similar workers (pay policy) and whom they employ (workforce composition). Pay policy dominates, accounting for about two-thirds of the firm component’s variance, and the two margins reinforce: higher-paying firms employ higher-wage workforces. Holding observable cells fixed across Portugal’s recovery, the fall in log-wage variance is explained by changing cell wage schedules rather than by workforce reallocation or re-sorting. The two-sided structure usually credited to latent worker and firm effects is thus visible in observed characteristics on the worker side, much less so on the firm side.