Joint work with Francesco Del Prato; VisitINPS 2020 project. Under revision. NEW VERSION COMING SOON!

Abstract. We explore the effect of a reduction in overall labor costs, indirectly induced by an Italian reform that weakened employment protection legislation, on the productivity distribution of manufacturing firms. Due to the unique institutional features of the Italian collective bargaining system, in the manufacturing sector the reform led to a clean reduction in average worker compensation, without altering the average structure of employment relationships. This decrease in labor cost resulted in a reduction in average total factor productivity (TFP) among less productive firms, and an increase at the upper end of the distribution. We pair these findings with increased entry and exit dynamics among low-productivity firms, suggesting the presence of an adverse selection mechanism at the bottom of the TFP distribution, enhanced by the reform. We formalize this concept via a general equilibrium model that links productivity to frictions in the markets for inputs.

Joint work with Francesco Del Prato. Under review.

Abstract. We study informational financial frictions in heterogeneous firm economies with monopolistic competition.We extend the Melitz model by introducing banks that finance entrepreneurs under asymmetric information. While aggregate productivity decreases with information frictions, welfare can be maximized at intermediate levels of asymmetry due to a trade-off between productivity and product variety. Furthermore, moderate input cost distortions can improve welfare when financial frictions are severe by offsetting the resulting weak firm selection.

Extended abstract (for conference submissions) available on request.

Abstract. I consider the problem of estimating the parameters of a game where players are allowed to play correlated equilibria (Aumann, 1974). I show that the existence of correlation between strategies is testable, and I develop an empirical application of the proposed estimator to assess spatial collusion in airline entry.