Abstract. We document an ample degree of dispersion of supplier quality, defined as the effect of a supplier’s inputs on its buyer’s sales, in the Costa Rican production network. Supplier quality also appears uncorrelated with buyer unobservables, suggesting the existence of both informational and spatial frictions affecting firms’ choice of suppliers. We quantify these two forces via a structural model of production network formation.
Abstract. Borrowing tools from the practice of neural networks, I design an empirical framework for the analysis of “hierarchical networks:” socio-economic settings featuring multiple, layered networks, whose nodes are linked across layers. I use this framework to revisit questions involving networks of workers and firms.
Joint work with Francesco Del Prato.
Abstract. In local labor markets, workers often move at early stages of their careers from lower-paying firms that provide them training, to better-paying, specialized firms. We call this mechanism “human capital value chain” and we document its implications on both workers’ wage paths and local agglomeration externalities.
Abstract. I consider the problem of estimating the parameters of a game where players are allowed to play correlated equilibria (Aumann, 1974). I show that the existence of correlation between strategies is testable, and I develop an empirical application of the proposed estimator to assess spatial collusion in airline entry.